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ABSTRACT
This study explores the relationship between crime and violence and the 
University Medical Center o f Southern Nevada. An investigation was conducted to 
determine how crime and violence affects the medical center from an economic, 
security, staff and organizational response perspective.
Nursing staff and security officer interviews, supplemented with security 
department incident reports, suggest a perception problem exists. Nurses interviewed 
believe a major cost o f crime and violence at the medical center is the perceived threat 
to their personal safety by gang members and patients under the influence o f drugs or 
alcohol. Security officer interviews and data from incident reports suggest the major 
cost of crime and violence at the hospital center has to do with minor property 
offenses and not threats or assaults against staff. Additionally, nursing attitudes and 
compassion levels seem to be negatively affected from treating large numbers o f 
patients whom they feel are deserving o f their injuries.
Ill
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PREFACE
From March o f 1985 to July o f 1995,1 worked on an ambulance in New York 
City. As a New York State and nationally registered paramedic, 1 estimate that over 
that ten year period, 1 responded to between fifteen or sixteen thousand “91 
emergency calls.
A subtle transformation occurred as 1 evolved from a rookie medic to an 
experienced veteran. My views concerning people, health care, society, crime, 
violence, good, evil, life and death slowly changed. There w asn't one individual 
event that caused this transformation. For a while, the good shifts 1 had depended on 
the misfortune o f others. For me to have an exciting productive day required 
someone else to get shot, stabbed, hit by a truck or incur some equally traumatic 
medical emergency. At times it was easy to rationalize other’s misfortunes: they were 
gang members, and as such were expected to get shot; o f  course she had a heart 
attack, she weighed three himdred pounds and smoked like a chimney; and homeless 
people who live in the subways are occasionally going to get run over by trains.
There were times when we knew about the new trends, locations or personnel 
involved in illegal activity before the police did. After a few people overdosed (and 
did not respond to traditional treatment) in the same back alley, behind the same bar, 
during the same midnight shift, the paramedics in midtown Manhattan knew there 
was a new type o f powerful heroin hitting the streets.
VI
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We knew when the homeless shelters were open. We knew when the 
psychiatric facilities had released inpatients. We knew when the methadone clinics 
closed. We knew when the city’s social service unit cleaned out the subways.
1 saw the best and the worst o f the city.
But I changed. 1 might not have known it then. But 1 know it now.
Anyone who witnesses the death and destruction that we paramedics did on a 
regular basis has to change. Whether one acknowledges those changes or not, it's 
certain that they occur. One may become more careful as one does their job, or 
radically less so. Maybe you become more compassionate with patients, or decidedly 
colder. Perhaps one becomes more open and forthright in their relationships, or 
become withdrawn and introspective. 1 do not believe there is a mold or pattern that 
emergency workers can be pigeon holed into. But 1 do know that we all adapt to our 
environment. It’s our nature. The bottom line is we try to do our jobs as best we can.
It's what we do.
1 dedicate this thesis to those people who do their best to pick up the pieces.
vu
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In 1993, there were 92.8 million visits to the emergency rooms o f non-federal. 
short stay hospitals in the United States (Statistical Abstract o f the U.S. 1995:129).
As a major entry point into the hospital, the emergency department (E.D.*), and its 
personnel, are subjected to the increased risk o f assaults, shootings and a host o f  other 
serious security problems. The 1991 issue o f the Journal o f Healthcare Protection 
Management, the publication o f  the International Association for Healthcare Security 
and Safety (lAHSS), showed that violent incidents continue to increase in the hospital 
setting, particularly in the E.D.s (Hagland 1992).
In a one year study by the lAHSS, violent assaults in selected hospitals 
increased 25% from 1,435 reported incidents in 1988 to 1,789 reported incidents in 
1989 (Hagland 1992:30). In a  1990 LAHSS follow up study, 335 responding hospitals 
reported 2,293 assaults (nearly 7 per hospital), the majority occurring in the 
emergency department (Lang 1993:37). Former Labor Department Secretary Robert 
Reich has pointed out that health and social services employees endured a 
dramatically higher incidence o f  fatal assaults than many other occupations. From 
1980 to 1990, 18 RNs and 88 other health care workers were killed in job-related
1
* Emergency Department (E.D.) and Emergency Room (E.R.) are frequently 
interchanged.
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homicides (Brider 1996:169). A 1993 Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) report, citing Bureau o f Labor Statistics data, showed that 
health care and social service workers had the highest incidence o f assault injuries in 
any workplace (Brienza 1996:77). The majority o f the nonfatal workplace assaults 
that occurred in health and social service facilities were primarily attacks by patients 
on nursing staff (Brider 1996).
The presence o f security officers is not an absolute deterrent to violence in the 
hospital setting. As one nurse reported, “security guards can’t always be nearby when 
we’re treating patients. Even if  there were enough guards to go around, a patient's 
right to privacy demands that we be alone with him” (Kinkle 1993:23). Moreover, 
security officers are often the targets o f that violence. According to Barry Feinstein, 
president of the Teamsters Local 237 which represents the security police officers 
patrolling New York City’s 16 public hospitals, “in the course o f a year, as many as 
one-third of our people will miss work because they’ve been shot, knifed, struck with 
lead pipes, or otherwise physically beaten” (Johnsson 1990:56).
Understanding E.D. Violence
It appears generally accepted in the literature that violent behavior in the E.D. 
stems from two major sources; increases in urban crime in general, and gangs and 
drugs in particular (Hagland 1992:30). Violence is also believed to be the result of 
the stress and anger created by long waits for treatment (Keep & Gilbert 1995; 
Simonowitz 1994).
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“Long hospital delays clearly contribute to the strong potential for violence in 
our waiting room,” says Dr. Robert Hockberger, chairman o f the department o f 
emergency medicine at Los Angeles Country Harbor-UCLA Medical Center. “We’ve 
gone from 80,000 patients in 1982 to 120,000 in 1991, but the E.D. itself and our 
staffing are essentially the same” (Hagland 1992:31). And as emergency room nurse 
Vicki Sweet from Hoag Memorial Hospital in Newport Beach reported, “the waits are 
getting longer. And people here have a drive-thru mentality; they think an E.R. can 
operate like a fast-food restaurant” (AJN 1993:92).
Responding to E.D. Violence
It is difficult to eliminate violence from an E.D., especially when the 
environment outside the hospital is violent. Even an E.D. that has taken preventative 
measures will experience an occasional incident (Keep & Gilbert 1995). There have 
been responses by hospitals attempting to reduce the dangers to their employees.
Some common sense tactics include removing all potential weapons from the E.D. 
waiting room such as glass bottles, movable chairs, non-mounted phones and objects 
with sharp or hard surfaces. Personalized safety precautions for staff, such as 
avoiding certain types o f hairstyle, clothing or jewelry that could allow a potential 
attacker to easily grab, pull or control the staff member have been advised. Some 
hospitals have taken considerably more drastic measures. White Memorial Hospital 
in Los Angeles, following a gang related shooting, physically relocated the E.D. away 
from the street to an area inside the radiology department (Hagland 1992).
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To keep violent people from getting to the staff in the first place. California 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) officials recommend bullet 
proof glass in the triage, admitting, and other reception areas. Additional 
recommendations include: locked or key-coded doors inside the E.D. to limit access 
to treatment areas, closed circuit TV monitors to survey concealed or problem areas, 
and metal detectors to screen for weapons in the E.D.s and psychiatric facilities 
(Simonowitz 1994:62). Audubon Humana Hospital in Louisville, Kentucky, has gone 
one step further by using biometrics to solve a security problem in their laboratories. 
This biometric technology uses a sensor to “recognize” a person’s voice and allow 
access to secured areas (Moran 1990). While some o f  these recommendations may 
seem excessive and expensive, it is important to note that in 1993 a Chicago 
psychiatric hospital where nurses and attendants had been beaten by patients became 
the first health care facility to be cited by OSHA for not protecting employees from 
violence (Simonowitz 1994:62).
There are, however, difficult practical issues to be considered when attempting 
to increase security. Metal detectors and x-ray machines, for example, require the 
hiring and training o f specialized personnel to operate the new equipment. The 
hospital would then also need better trained and more heavily armed security officers 
capable o f disarming armed visitors. Dr. Frank Lavoie and colleagues found that, 
after the installation o f a metal detector in one teaching hospital emergency 
department, there were over 300 incidents o f  persons carrying weapons within the 
first month (Lavoie, Carter, Danzl & Berg 1988). Lavoie’s findings would not come 
as a surprise to emergency room nurses in California. In a 1992 survey o f 103 E.D.
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nurse managers from inner city, urban and rural hospitals across that state found that 
in the previous year more than half o f all emergency departments reported incidents 
that involved weapons brought into the department by patients or visitors. The most 
common weapons were knives and loaded guns (Keep & Gilbert 1992:436). One 
OSHA guideline pointed to a study showing that as many as one-fourth o f hospital 
patients, their friends or family members may be carrying a weapon (H uff 1997).
The Care of Crime Victims
Unlike most private health care facilities, municipal hospital emergency 
departments and the specialized emergency units designed specifically for trauma 
patients, called trauma centers, caimot choose which patients they will or will not 
admit. And as trauma centers around the country continue to close (between 1983 
and 1989,66 centers were closed [Skolnick 1992:2994]), the burden placed upon the 
remaining centers multiplies. The existing emergency departments remain the 
primary' sources o f health care for victims of violent crime, the poor and uninsured 
(Sklar 1994).
During the 1992 Los Angeles riots, hospitals treating large numbers of riot 
victims suffered substantial financial loss since most o f the patients had no health 
insurance, public or private. Peter Bastone, executive vice president and 
administrator o f  Daniel Freeman Memorial Hospital reported, “in addition to the one 
million dollars lost from the fact that 80% of the patients treated had no insurance, 
elective surgeries (a hospital money maker) were canceled and some in the region are
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now reluctant to come to Daniel Freeman because they think it's in a dangerous 
neighborhood” (Hudson 1992:25).
Riots and other mass scale disturbances aside, the day-to-day violence in 
American society is placing a tremendous strain on hospitals and the health care 
system. According to the federal Center for Disease Control and Prevention, by the 
year 2003, gunfire will have surpassed auto accidents as the leading cause o f injury 
death in the United States. As o f 1996, in seven states it already has (Headden 
1996:31; Kizer, Vassar, Harry & Layton 1995:1768). In 1991, the most common 
cause o f death for African American males 15 to 24 years o f age was gunshot wounds 
(Cornwell, Jacobs & Walker 1995:1788). For every patient who dies from a gunshot 
wound (there were 39,720 in 1994) three others are injured seriously enough to be 
hospitalized (Headden 1996:37). Gunshot patients are far more expensive to care for 
than victims o f  other kinds o f  crime. A “typical” stab wound cost $6,446 to treat 
(Headden 1996:34), while the “average” gunshot case costs around $15,000 to 
$20,000 (Headden 1996:34; Wagner 1990:24). Since 4 out o f 5 gunshot victims, are 
on public assistance or uninsured, unlike car crash victims who are frequently insured, 
taxpayers bear the brunt o f medical costs that have soared nearly nine-fold in the past 
ten years to a staggering $4.5 billion a year (Headden 1996:34).
Additionally, the greater use o f semi-automatic weapons has increased the 
intensity o f  these injuries. According to Dr. John Barrett the trauma director o f 
Chicago's Cook County Hospital, “ in 1982, only 5% of the patients admitted for 
gunshot wounds had been shot more than once. By 1991, that proportion had risen to 
25%'' (Skolnick 1992:2994). It should not come as a surprise that the military has
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been sending their surgical residents to train at trauma centers around the countrj'. 
The Medical Shock Trauma Acute Resuscitation Unit (MedStar) in Washington,
D C., provides the new Army and Navy physicians with outstanding training. “From 
the military point o f view, the trauma cases (gunshot and stab wounds) that the 
residents and fellows see while they are in the MedStar program are the best 
approximations we can get to military combat” says Colonel Juan D’Avis, chief of 
surgery at Walter Reed Hospital (Marwick 1991:1047).
Estimates vary regarding the exact figures concerning the medical costs of 
violence. Four billion dollars seems to be a  somewhat consistent figure regarding the 
expense o f caring for gunshot victims (Chafee 1992:20; Headden 1996:31 ; Kizer et 
al. 1995:1768). One estimate o f the medical and mental health costs stemming from 
violent crimes like murder, rape, assault, and robbery total approximately $ 11 billion 
each year (Collins 1994:40). There are some reports that estimate the overall costs of 
violent victimization to be much greater. According to researchers from the 
University o f California at San Francisco and the National Public Services Research 
Institute in Landover, Maryland, “the cost o f  treating a crime-related physical injury 
averages $41,000, and all the injury causing crimes that occur in a year in the country 
ultimately cost $202 billion in medical fees, psychological costs, and productivity 
losses over the victim's lifetimes” (Buss 1994:17).
Whether one accepts the $202 billion figure or not, there is little disagreement 
that trauma care for victims o f gunshot wounds is extremely expensive. Moreover, 
many of the patients are not covered by insurance (Skolnick 1992). Two thirds o f the 
gunshot wound patients in a Sacramento County, California study did not have
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
8
insurance (Kizer et al. 1995:1771 ). According to Dr. Markovchick, director o f 
emergency medical services for Denver Health and Hospital, “90% of [our] 
penetrating trauma patients are uninsured and the hospital doesn’t recover anything” 
(Wagner 1990:26).
Parkland Hospital in Dallas, Texas, where President John F. Kennedy was 
taken following his gunshot injuries, expected to lose $23 million in 1992 chiefly 
from unreimbursed trauma care. Overall, trauma care is running nearly $300 million 
a year in uncompensated funds in Texas alone (Dworetzky 1992:28).
While the bulk o f the crime analysis o f health care focuses on medical costs, 
patient payments, government reimbursement, and insurance coverage, little is known 
about other ways in which violence and crime affects the day-to-day operations o f a 
hospital. This thesis is an exploratory case study o f  the University Medical Center o f 
Southern Nevada (UMC). As such, research questions will be put forth which will 
examine and identify relationships between crime and violence and the operations o f 
UMC. Among the questions to be addressed are:
•  How has crime and violence affected UMC economically?
(A) Is crime and violence affecting UMC’s economic well being?
(B) How has UMC’s expenditures changed in response to crime and 
violence?
•  How has UMC’s operating procedures changed in response to crime and 
violence?
•  How has crime and violence affected UMC’s personnel?
•  What are the hidden costs o f crime and violence on UMC?
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Data from a single case study cannot provide a definitive answer to the 
question o f  how crime and violence affects hospital operations. However, this study 
can suggest new avenues for future research about this important topic.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter will discuss the literature which addresses the subjects o f  crime 
and violence and their relationship to hospitals. The first section is a brief overview 
o f some basic sociological literature. This literature, from many o f the preeminent 
sociological theorists, contains information briefly covering such topics as the 
effectiveness o f organizations, organizational relationships, employee stress, and 
status passages. The basic sociological concepts found in this literature are easily 
related to the specifics o f the present case study.
The second section explores the issue o f  violence and economics, which also 
includes the topic o f cost shifting. The economic issues surrounding health care and 
violence are predominantly found in the physician targeted medical journals. The 
Journal o f the American Medical Association and The New England Journal of 
Medicine focus almost exclusively on the expenses o f providing medical care, actual 
costs o f said care, and reimbursement issues for the hospitals, physicians and society.
The third section examines some o f the specific issues regarding health care 
workers and their workplace security. Safety issues are almost always found in the 
nursing and health care related publications. The American Journal o f Nursing, 
Journal o f Emergency Nursing, and Hospitals, seem to focus on the human aspects of
10
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violence in the hospital setting; primarily, the increase in assaults against health care 
professionals, the risks and factors associated with hospital violence, and the growing 
concern about employee safety.
The final section provides some history and practical knowledge important for 
an understanding o f hospitals and trauma centers. Since most victims of gunshot or 
stabbing injuries are transported to trauma centers (specialized units within a 
hospital), a section o f literature regarding their history and dynamics is appropriate.
A. NURSING STRESS AND IDENTITY
Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum (1957) point out that many factors are 
relevant in determining an organization’s effectiveness. Among these, morale, 
member satisfaction, turnover, absenteeism and market fluctuations are all 
contributing factors to efficiency and effectiveness. Therefore, the authors define 
organizational effectiveness as, “the extent to which an organization as a social 
system, given certain resources and means, fulfills its objectives without 
incapacitating its means and resources and without placing undue strain upon its 
members” (Georgopoulos & Tannenbaum 1957:535-536).
Such strain, when applied to nurses working in a hospital setting, can prompt 
serious organizational inefficiency. Strain on nursing staff can be manifested in a 
variety o f ways. Hiscott and Connop (1990) discovered a strong relationship between 
shift length, rotating shifts, and working round-the-clock hours with nursing 
dissatisfaction which contributed to job turnover. Ling (1992) reported that in 
addition to rotating shifts, the unpredictability o f patient volume, the wide array o f
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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medical problems and the high acuity o f patient illness and injury also contribute to 
high levels o f nursing stress. Fang and Baba (1993:25) concluded that stress, 
identified as “an emotional response to stimuli that may have dysfunctional, 
psychological, behavioral, and/or physiological consequences,” clearly plays a role in 
the job dissatisfaction rates o f  nurses. Additionally, the authors determined that 
increases in role ambiguity, role conflict and role overload provide a significant 
predictor o f turnover intentions.
Hospitals, like other complex organizations have a variety o f interactants 
doing various types o f work, which must be articulated through arrangements. Corbin 
and Strauss (1993) reported that the work a nursing staff must do in hospitals requires 
coordinated and cooperative arrangements with physicians and other departments 
(such as pharmacy, housekeeping, dietary and laboratories). According to the authors, 
these arrangements are usually worked out within or between departments through a 
series o f interactional strategies that usually but not always involve negotiation and 
persuasion. Additionally, “when these arrangements breakdown the work may be 
delayed, suffer in quality, and sometimes not get done at all” (Corbin & Strauss 
1993:74).
The relationship between hospital staff and hospital security department was 
explored by Winfree and Williams (1985). Not surprisingly, of all hospital 
employees, nurses had the greatest contact with the security department, and the 
majority o f those contacts took place in the emergency departments and waiting 
rooms. Furthermore, nurses were identified as the predominant “at risk” group inside 
the hospital. This “at risk” status further compounds on-the-job stress. Nudelman
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(1995:62) concluded, “employees threatened or harmed by workplace violence
become less productive or simply leave for a safer workplace.”
The decrease in workplace productivity is identified as a primary symptom of
workplace burnout. According to John-Henry Pfifferling, the director o f  the Center
for Professional Well-Being in Durham, North Carolina,
burnout occurs incrementally, as unrealistic expectations clash with 
reality. People lose the joy they had in their work, and are slowly nibbled 
to death. Those who are burning out are too depleted to give of 
themselves in a creative fashion. So beyond the loss to the individual, 
the organization and society pay a heavy price, losing providers too 
soon (Montague 1994:178).
Eastburg, Williamson, Gorsuch & Ridley (1994) report that a personality 
construct that has been related to nurse stress is identified as “personality hardiness.”
It is hypothesized that a group of attitudes, beliefs, and behavioral tendencies exists 
which “tend to insulate individuals from the ill-health effects o f high degree o f  life 
stress” (Eastburg et al 1994:1235).
It is reported by Gilmore and Barnett (1992:538) that, “patients drain the 
nurses, who often have to displace their aggressive feelings away from the patients 
onto the systems or administration that appear never to support them adequately in 
their difficult work.” While this researcher does not question Gilmore and Barnett's 
reporting o f nurse's feelings o f inadequate support from supervisors and 
administrators, it is possible that their findings o f nurses diverting aggression away 
from patients onto administrators was too idealistic. There is considerable literature 
to suggest that nurses, as well as other health care providers, consistently provide less 
then admirable care depending upon their particular prejudices or clientele. Howard
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and Strauss (1975) show that inherent worth, uniqueness as an individual, wholeness 
o f person, freedom o f action, and equality o f status all reflect different levels o f  care 
by health workers and the health-care system in accordance with the biases o f  the rest 
o f the social order. Roth (1972) showed that the perception o f social worth on staff 
evaluations o f patients who came to the hospital for emergency services reflected the 
concepts o f social worth common in the larger society. Furthermore, according to 
Howard & Strauss (1975:178), “patients labeled as drunks are more consistently 
treated as undeserving than any other category of patient.”
It is apparent that some nurses deviate from one o f their basic ethical tenets; 
that is, “to deliver care in a nonjudgmental and nondiscriminatory manner that is 
sensitive to client diversity” (ANA 1991:15). Assuming that not all nurses violate 
these tenets, those who do would be considered a deviant subgroup of nurses. Many 
deviant groups have a self-justifying rationale. According to Becker (1963), these 
justifications “furnish the individual with reasons that appear sound for continuing the 
line o f activity that he [sic] has begun” (Becker 1963:39). Furthermore, Becker 
believes that many kinds o f deviant activity spring from motives which are socially 
learned. Becker goes on to say. “whether a person takes this step or not depends not 
so much on what he does as on what other people do, on whether or not they enforce 
the rule he has violated” (Becker 1963:31). Finally, it is noted that when a person 
makes a definite move into an organized deviant group, or when he or she realizes 
and accepts the fact that they have already done so, it has a powerful impact on their 
conceptions o f themselves.
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These conceptions may involve a  status passage. According to Glaser and 
Strauss (1971:2), “such passages [status passages] may entail movement into a 
different part o f a social structure; or a loss or gain of privilege, influence, or power, 
and a changed identity and sense of self, as well as changed behavior.” Glaser and 
Strauss identify twelve properties which may characterize a status passage. Selected 
characteristics relating specifically to this study include;
• The passage may be considered in some measure desirable or 
undesirable by the person making the passage or by other relevant 
parties.
• The passage may be inevitable.
• The person who goes through the passage may do so alone, collectively, 
or in aggregate with any number o f  other persons.
•  It follows that when people go through a passage collectively, or in 
aggregate, they may not be aware that they are all going through it 
together or at least not aware o f all aspects o f their similar passages.
•  The clarity o f  the signs o f passage, for the various parties, may vary 
from great to negligible clarity. In other words the signs are not always 
so clear to the person
(Glaser & Strauss 1971 ;4-5).
Glaser and Strauss, and Becker’s theories regarding self conceptions and 
status changes, which are traditionally applied to deviance, can also be applied to 
children living in violent environments. It is reported that many psychotherapists 
think that children exposed to violence develop the same symptoms as “shell­
shocked” soldiers in wartime. Psychiatrists first started using the diagnosis post 
traumatic stress syndrome (PTSS) to describe the circumstances o f Vietnam veterans 
who were unable to adjust when they returned home (Prothrow-Stith 1993:68). It was
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initially believed that children trapped in violent circumstances may also exhibit the 
symptoms of PTSS. Recently mental health providers have begun to see signs of 
PTSS in crime victims, in the victims o f  terrorist attacks, and in children chronically 
exposed to violence in their homes and communities (Prothrow-Stith 1993:68).
It would not be unreasonable to conclude that emergency and trauma 
department nurses, who are chronically exposed to victims o f crime and violence, 
who work in the most uncontrolled and dangerous settings o f the hospital, may 
experience their own versions of post traumatic stress syndrome.
B. VIOLENCE AND ECONOMICS
A great deal o f  research has focused on the cost and expense o f providing 
medical care for victims o f violence. These costs are then compared to the actual 
payment for services that patients are charged, and the amount of reimbursement, both 
direct and indirect, that the hospital receives for this emergency treatment.
Firearm injuries are an extremely expensive type o f injury to treat, and most 
victims are non or under insured (Headden 1996:34; Skolnick 1992:2994; Wagner 
1990:23). Hospitals may lose money treating the firearm and stabbing victims of 
violence. But these costs can be more than offset, if the majority o f their patients 
have insurance, through a strategy known as “cost shifting”. Cost shifting is the 
process o f overcharging hospital patients who can pay or have insurance to 
compensate for those who cannot. If there were a question regarding the legality of 
such measures, a ruling by the United States Court o f  Appeal for the Third Circuit
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ruled that states may legally shift the hospital costs o f caring for people without 
insurance onto those who have insurance (NY Times 1993).
In an excellent example o f  cost shifting Kizer, Vassar,. Harry, and. Layton 
(1995) reported on a three year study o f the University of California, Davis. Medical 
Center (UCDMC). Those researchers showed that, though the trauma center was 
losing money on two out of three patients treated for gunshot injuries, the institution’s 
pricing structure was such that firearm-related wounds, as an aggregate, contributed 
nearly $4.4 million to the hospital’s net income. The UCDMC achieves a net income 
by increasing charges above costs at 3.8 times greater than the actual cost o f providing 
the care, to that minority of patients who have insurance, to compensate for the 
majority who do not (Kizer et al. 1995). It was determined that hospitals in the early 
1980s added an average o f 10% to privately insured patients’ bills to cover the cost o f  
under-compensated care. By the early 1990s the economic research firm o f Browne, 
Bortz & Coddington calculated this to add-on was approaching 70% (Hopkins 1992).
A similar study of the costs related to firearm injuries by Martin, Hunt and 
Hulley (1988) concentrated more on the relationship between public and private payer 
sources. Their study found that public sources paid 85.6% o f the costs, while private 
payer sources paid only 14.4%. The authors urged legislators to restrict the 
availability o f firearms, since they believed that the issue is not simply one of 
individual rights, since taxpayers pay most o f the cost associated with firearm 
injuries. The impact o f  firearm injuries has been well-documented (Wagner 1990; 
Skolnick 1992; and Chafee 1992). The increase costs of hospitalization, the 
proliferation o f handguns on the streets, and the high cost o f violence are believed
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responsible for the closing of 90 trauma centers since 1985. Additionally, firearm, 
stabbing, and drug related violence and economic effects on inner city trauma centers 
was examined. Skolnick (1992) predicts that Congress may have to come to the aid 
of some trauma centers that are in financial straits. The lack o f  reimbursement from 
most victims o f violence, and ways that some states have been trying to support their 
trauma systems have also been explored. The Governor o f Maryland in 1992 
proposed an $8 surcharge on all vehicle registrations to save one o f the nation’s best 
trauma systems. Other possibilities include proposals regarding the levying of a “gun 
tax” on firearm manufacturers (Skolnick 1992). It is stressed that unlike most o f the 
major killers (heart disease, stroke) that show up later in life, trauma injuries primarily 
affect younger people, causing more years o f  potential life lost.
The effects of trauma center closings on remaining trauma centers has been 
examined (Larkin 1989; Laskowski-Jones 1993; Hopkins 1992). The effect on 
Chicago’s trauma system when the University o f  Chicago hospitals pulled out o f the 
city's trauma network has been clearly documented. Trauma admissions quadrupled 
at nearby Michael Reese Hospital and Medical Center. For the three months 
following the University o f  Chicago pullout, trauma care loses at Michael Reese 
totaled $400,000; which also threatened to pull out o f the network if bailout funds 
were not obtained (Larkin 1989;22-23).
While patient care issues and finances are explored in many studies, there are 
lesser examined economic factors that one needs to be aware of. Administrative 
costs, costs for upgrading communication equipment, and for creating a 911 system 
must be considered. Additional expenses to upgrade staff, facilities, and equipment
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are all associated with the high cost o f trauma centers (Laskowski-Jones 1993). The 
massive costs to establish and maintain these centers encourages hospitals to find 
additional ways to compensate themselves for non paying patients. Because Medicaid 
and Medicare provides paltry reimbursement, doctors are discouraged from treating 
the poor and the elderly. According to a 1992 Health Insurance Association o f 
America survey, Medicaid reimburses doctors an average o f just 55% o f  what private 
insurance pays for the same service. As Hopkins (1992:75) describes in detail, in 
some cases these payments are considerably lower: 37% for tonsillectomies, 29% for 
coronary bypass surgery, and a pathetic 15% o f the going rate for obstetrical services, 
including delivery. As o f 1992, only five states nationwide reimburse hospitals 
enough to cover the cost o f caring for Medicaid patients (Hopkins 1992:75). The lack 
o f  private medical care forces these patients to utilize emergency departments as their 
primary care medical provider. It stands to reason that occasional care in the 
emergency room is better than no care at all. In this regard the emergency department 
has become increasingly important to the urban poor who are increasingly unable to 
access private medical services (Steinbrook 1996:657).
Spencer (1994) confirmed Hopkin’s and Steinbrook’s findings. Spencer 
reminds us that people who have no health insurance not only receive care, but 
receive the most expensive care, that delivered in the emergency rooms. Citing from 
the Congressional Budget Office, the author also points out the deficiencies in 
Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement rates.
The disproportionate reimbursement rates for victims of violence continues to 
affect trauma center viability. Firearm victims, who are among the most expensive
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 0
type o f patient to treat, are also some o f the most underinsured. Since the government 
(i.e, taxpayers) pays approximately 86 percent o f  the medical bills for gunshot 
violence, many observers recommend that developing a system to compensate 
hospitals for these additional costs may be worthwhile to preserve access to care for 
disadvantaged patients and to ensure the financial viability of the institutions that 
serve the disadvantaged and poor (Martin, Hunt & Hulley 1988:3048; Stem,
Weissman & Epstein 1991:2338).
C. HOSPITAL SAFETY ISSUES
Issues regarding hospital safety seem to be mostly ignored by the two major 
physician targeted journals. There are virtually no safety or security related articles 
published in either the Journal o f the American Medical Association, or The New 
England Journal o f Medicine.
By contrast, studies regarding hospital safety and on-the-job violence seem to 
be promoted by the nursing associations and their publications: the American Journal 
of Nursing. Nursing and RN. There may be a very logical reason for the discrepancy 
in safety and security articles between the predominantly male physician journals and 
the predominantly female nursing publications. Women are traditionally more 
concerned for their personal safety than men. In addition, most hospital employees 
are women. And to some extent, men are less likely to admit to being scared, feeling 
unsafe, or o f even being assaulted by a patient, or co worker. There is evidence that 
many E.D. employees feel that some degree o f violence is part o f their jobs, and that 
reporting it would be a sign o f weakness (Nursing 1993; Lenehan 1991).
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A number of books have been published specifically on the subject o f  
hospitals and safety. Most o f these books are targeted for hospital administrators or 
directors o f hospital security departments. There are, however, more general works 
that are continually cited in the healthcare, safety and security literature.
Turner (1984) focused on the role o f  administrators in medical facilities. He 
emphasized the administrator’s responsibility for development o f a viable security 
program. He stressed that hospitals are at a particular risk o f crime, because they 
operate 24 hours a day, employ a high percentage o f women, and have helpless 
“customers.” Pascal (1977), while somewhat outdated given today’s increase in gang, 
drug and weapons problems, is still frequently utilized for basic safety and self 
protection recommendations. Pascal advises that the onus is upon the employer to rid 
the place o f  employment from hazards that may adversely affect the general safety 
and well-being o f the employees. Further he stresses, to protect the safety o f 
employees, extraneous information such as home address, telephone number or social 
security number, should not be included on any visible hospital identification card. 
Colling (1992) writes on many o f the modem problems facing today’s hospitals.
While the book is filled with facts and economic figures highlighting security 
department needs. Colling is careful to emphasize that it’s impossible to compare the 
protection budget o f one organization to that o f another - even though the 
organizations may be similar in terms of size, type and environmental setting. 
Although, no two hospitals are exactly the same, there is a consensus that violence in 
the emergency department has escalated and is now a much greater problem than had 
been in the past.
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There are a number o f  relevant articles on emergency department and hospital 
safety. These articles, written primarily by nurses, are specifically geared towards 
identifying problems and reducing violence in the hospital setting. Mahoney (1991), 
reminds the reader that emergency nurses are at a higher risk for victimization than 
either the general public or other hospital workers. A survey o f  California emergency 
department nurses conducted by Keep and Gilbert (1992) focused on violent episodes 
and incidents inside their E.D.’s. One o f their findings was the frequency of 
dangerous weapons, specifically knives and loaded firearms, being brought into their 
emergency departments. In another Keep and Gilbert (1995) article, an E.D. safety 
checklist assessing the potential danger in specific situations is presented. Examples 
of safety problems included: the number o f uncontrolled entrances in the E.D.; 
isolated or unmonitored areas where staff might be assaulted; inadequate means to 
call for help and not enough security guards. They also provide many pointers for 
reducing the risks associated in working in an emergency department: knowing where 
all the exits in a particular room are; knowing if  there are potential weapons in the 
room; keeping a safe distance from a potentially violent patient and knowing how to 
summon help if  an emergency should arise. Kurlowicz (1990) noted that summoning 
help is easier when the E.D. has an established protocol. Panic buttons, telephone 
codes, autodialers, or a radio/intercom system are all valuable for summoning help in 
an emergency.
Additional workplace and security issues are discussed by Kinkle (1993), 
Simonowitz (1994) and Hagland (1992). Each author details workplace safety issues 
including: treating violent patients, security lapses, communication strategies, and
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techniques for dealing with violent occurrences. According to these authors, many 
violent occurrences are tied to the spread o f gang and drug activity. Two 
anonymously authored articles in Nursing (1993) and The American Journal of 
Nursing. (1993) respectively, cite additional factors that lead to emergency 
department violence. These factors, in addition to gang and drug problems, cite 
inflexible hospital rules and policies, inadequate staffing, seclusion o f patients or 
families, invasion o f personal space and extended emergency department waiting 
times.
Security issues have become more and more prevalent in the literature. And 
while Brider ( 1996) chronicled the dramatically higher rate o f  fatal assaults on health 
and social service employees between 1980 and 1990, the tasks and intervention the 
hospital security officers are authorized to perform have also been changing. While 
some hospitals have been expanding the security officer’s role, other facilities rely on 
the local police for the more serious interventions. Winfree and Williams (1985) 
write on the relationship between the hospital and its security force. In addition to the 
day-to-day interaction o f the staff members, they detail some o f the problems of 
policing a public hospital. For example, public hospitals, unlike corporations and 
many private institutions, must remain largely open to all people. Ingress and egress 
is generally unrestricted, except in certain locations or at specific time.
The issue o f whether hospital security officer should be armed with firearms 
is examined by Johnsson (1990). While many hospital administrators present mixed 
views, most agree that the conditions outside the hospital will ultimately determine 
the level o f force needed inside the hospital. Conditions outside the hospital do
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influence the conduct inside the facility. Today the staff inside the hospital, especially 
the emergency room staff, need to be acutely aware o f the conditions and the 
environment outside their facility. Lang (1993) discussed the importance of 
familiarizing the hospital staff with gangs and their insignia. Since gangs frequently 
come to the hospital with wounded members, it behooves medical personnel to 
recognize potential trouble before it starts.
Broad safety issues relating specifically to hospitals and the general populous 
have become prevalent in day to day society. When dramatic events occur, especially 
well publicized ones, our fears become compounded and acute. It was during a study 
o f the 1992 Los Angeles riots that Hudson (1992) examined how hospitals survived 
and made best efforts to treat the riot victims. Financial repercussions were also 
examined since many of the riot victims were non or under insured. Other serious 
health and safety issues were investigated by Simolowe (1993). Her analysis focused 
on the various shootings and violent incidents, (such as the 1993 McDonald’s 
shooting spree in Kenosha, Wisconsin) that have impacted American’s views o f their 
physical safety. Included in this general article is a  report that incidents o f violence 
against health-care workers have increased dramatically.
D. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF TRAUMA CENTERS
The emergency medical services (EMS), as we know it, began in 1966 with 
the enactment o f the Highway Safety Act, which prompted the Department o f 
Transportation to require the development o f programs targeting highway injuries 
(Routh 1995:541). One such program, the Emergency Medical Services System Act
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 5
o f 1973, enabled several states to use federal funds to develop trauma systems. 
Unfortunately, these early efforts were severely hampered when federal support was 
not extended in the early 1980s. Although great strides were made in developing 
guidelines for optimal trauma care delivery, many early trauma systems lost 
momentum because o f  state and local budget crises (Bazzoli, Madura, Cooper, 
MacKenzie & M aier 1995:395).
In the late 1980s, as the increase o f violent injuries and the closing of trauma 
centers continued, the federal government began to make an effort to reestablish its 
economic ties to trauma care. In the “Trauma Care Systems Planning and 
Development Act o f  1990”, Congress acknowledged that physical trauma in the 
United States resulted in an aggregate annual cost o f $180 billion in medical 
expenses, insurance, lost wages and property damage. So the legislature’s 
authorization o f  $60 million to be appropriated for fiscal year 1991, with repeat 
allocations for 1992 and 1993, (while a start) seemed fairly inconsequential. Sixty 
million allocated, for an estimated cost o f $180 billion, is only a tiny fraction (.03%) 
o f the estimated annual cost o f trauma (Public Law 101-590).
Trauma centers can be independent and self contained emergency departments 
(as part o f a regular hospital) designed exclusively to treat serious traumatic injuries. 
Or. trauma units can consist of specialized personnel who, when activated, respond to 
the hospital’s regular emergency room to treat traumatic injury patients. Trauma 
centers are designated by specific levels. Level I and Level II centers typically 
provide comprehensive care to the most severely injured. Additionally, Level I 
centers are more involved in research, education and systems leadership activities.
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Level III facilities are responsible for stabilization, preliminary diagnosis and 
preparation for transport of severely injured patients to Level I or II facilities for 
definitive care (Bazzoli et al. 1995:397).
While patient choice o f hospitals is, for the most part, respected by pre­
hospital emergency ambulance personnel, hospital selection for trauma patients is not. 
Fire department and ambulance crews are bound by protocol to transport trauma 
patients to trauma centers. Unless extreme circumstances are present, the trauma 
patients will be transported to these specialized facilities. There is little question that 
trauma centers reduce mortality. Studies show that severely injured patients have 
improved chances for survival if  they are treated by these specialized trauma units. 
These centers usually provide better care and have higher patient survival rates than 
other hospitals even though they deal with the more seriously injured (Bazzoli et al. 
1995:395; Giacopassi & Sparger 1992;251; Doemer 1988:173). Some studies show 
that mortality can be reduced by as much as 70 percent if the intervention takes place 
within the “golden hour” (the hour immediately following the injury) (Dworetzy 
1992:28).
Progress in the development o f trauma systems in the United States is 
examined by Bazzoli, Madura. Cooper, MacKenzie and Maier (1995). The authors 
provide a strong overview o f the trauma systems that have been developed, their 
history and evolution. Bazzoli et al. concluded that while state and regional 
organizations have accomplished a great deal, they still have substantial work ahead 
in developing comprehensive trauma systems. According to Dr. Gregory Henry, 
associate professor. Department o f Surgery, University o f Michigan Medical Center,
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Ann Arbor, “a lot o f  trauma services are based on municipal concepts, such as paying 
a fire department for its standby ability, but a half-dozen trauma centers aren't needed 
in our medium-sized cities” (Montague 1993:40).
The most common deficiency in these established systems was the failure to 
limit the number o f  designated trauma centers based on community need. This lack 
o f community need, or over-extension o f unnecessary trauma centers, affirm the 
conclusions o f Narad and Smiley’s (1992). The authors focused on the twenty two 
California trauma centers that have dropped their trauma center designation since 
1982. They claim that at least one third o f  them should never have been designated a 
trauma center in the first place. And while Narad and Smiley are critical o f 
California's trauma system, they wholeheartedly endorse the concept o f trauma 
centers. They even go so far as to recommend that some centers in geographically 
desirable locations, but with non-lucrative patient mixes, receive direct subsidies to 
maintain the solvency o f their trauma programs. A blunt/penetrating injury ratio o f 
4:1 has been defined as a healthy mix financially for the viability o f most trauma 
programs (Laskowski-Jones 1993:123).
Most trauma systems have an open designation process in which all interested 
hospitals are able to obtain the designation as a trauma center, provided the hospital 
meets rigid standards and requirements set by the Committee on Trauma of the 
American College o f Surgeons. To gain this specialized designation, a hospital must 
have a surgeon and other specialists in-house or available within specific times, thus 
minimizing the time to surgery (Narad & Smiley 1992:563). Start up costs for 
establishing a trauma center vary according to existing resources and geographic area.
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In 1989, the range o f  start up costs for 12 level II trauma centers in Florida averaged 
$800,000 dollars (Mendeloff & Cayten 1991). Interestingly, the start up costs o f a 
Level I trauma center are approximately $400,000 less than for Level II centers. This 
is explained by the following: Level I centers are usually upgraded from existing 
Level II institutions in large teaching hospitals. Level II centers are usually upgraded 
from community hospitals, and require a larger initial influx o f expensive personnel 
and resources.
It is possible that a large number o f hospitals initially obtained trauma center 
status in an effort to raise the prestige o f their facility, as well as to protect their 
market share. Both the hospital’s public and professional image can be enhanced 
with the addition o f a trauma service (Stein 1989). It is reasoned that emergency 
patients might bypass community hospitals in favor o f  a trauma center (Larkin 
1989:24; Garza 1990). There is some evidence that the designation creates a “halo 
effect” implying to some potential patients that the hospital has been found to be a 
center of excellence in one area, and may be in other areas as well. The flip side is 
the negative image o f the hospital that many (perspective patients) maintain, since 
they believe that trauma centers treat primarily drug-related patients, gang members 
and homeless persons (Narad & Smiley 1992;564).
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METHODOLOGY
Data for this thesis was derived from two primary sources: secondary data 
analysis and face-to-face and telephone interviews.
A. SECONDARY DATA SOURCES
Much o f the secondary data on UMC and its relationship to crime and 
violence came primarily from governmental publications. Hospitals in Nevada are 
required to file reports to the Nevada State Health Department on a wide variety of 
matters. The Nevada Annual Trauma Report and the Fiscal Year End Summary 
Utilization Report published by the Department o f Human Resources o f the Nevada 
State Health Department, from the years 1992 to 1996 provided much of the UMC 
statistical data. Incident report data from the UMC security department was furnished 
by the security director. Additional hospital fiscal data was provided by the UMC 
controllers office.
B. INTERVIEWS
Human subject data were gathered during private and confidential interviews. 
A loosely followed interview guide was utilized (see appendix B). While 
spontaneous conversation with interviewees was the ultimate goal, it was essential to
29
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cover a predetermined set o f  topics for the sake o f consistency. Question specific 
probes were designed to touch upon a number o f  issues with each subject. The 
specific issues included in the interview guide focused on the subject’s on-the-job 
experience with: crime, violence, gangs, and safety issues. The subject’s attitudes and 
opinions regarding the various types o f patients they treat were also explored.
Since questionnaire items can be biased negatively or positively (Babbie 
1990:131). the researcher attempted to keep the questions and probes as simple, 
straightforward and neutral as possible. By attempting to triangulate data sources 
(Miles & Huberman 1994:263) he believes that quality data was valid and reliable. 
When one interviewee described something unique, and to that point unmentioned by 
other subjects, the researcher would incorporate that topic into the future interviews. 
While that tactic enabled the interviews to continually evolve, due to time and 
agreement constraints the author was not able to return and re-interview previously 
interviewed subjects.
Certain ethical issues in human subject interviews arose. First and foremost, 
the author’s responsibility for protecting the anonymity o f his subjects was 
paramount. In addition to assuring potential subjects o f complete confidentiality, the 
author was careful not to place the subjects in any positions that might be 
compromising. If the research would discover anything that, upon release, could 
potentially harm the subject the researcher was careful to additionally disguise the 
subject’s identity. The author was extremely careful not to bring harm to the hospital 
or any o f his subjects.
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The author began his field research with an exploratory attitude to determine 
its feasibility. This process began when he applied for permission from the University 
of Nevada, Las Vegas's “Human Subjects” Review Board (see appendix A). After 
receiving authorization from the university to conduct research interviews, he 
contacted the public relations department at the University Medical Center. During 
this initial interview he described the nature o f  the project and what he hoped to 
ascertain from the research. After receiving a genuinely warm reception from the 
director o f  public relations towards this research project he was introduced to the 
department o f trauma services.
The researcher's initial goal was to obtain maximum access to the hospital and 
staff, which would allow me ample time to interview and observe several different 
hospital employees. Over the next two months the author worked his way up the 
trauma services chain o f command at UMC. Unfortunately access to the trauma unit 
and its personnel during their working hours was denied.
Nevertheless, the author’s enthusiasm to continue with the project remained. 
Through personal friendships with people in the medical field, this researcher was 
able to contact two nurses who worked in two different critical care units at UMC. 
After explaining this research project (and problem) both nurses (not known to each 
other) agreed not only to be interviewed, but to act as “gatekeepers” (Berg: 1995:107) 
and assist him in contacting other critical care nurses. Because o f these new time and 
access constraints, the author believed it was now necessary to limit the scope o f the 
study to the opinions and impressions o f  nurses. While the initial strategy included 
interviews with physicians and a broader group o f hospital employees, this minor
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setback in no way nullified this study’s worth. Nurses are the predominant employee 
group at UMC (Fiscal Year End Summary Report 1995) and their presence is 
essential throughout the hospital. Limiting the scope o f  the medical staff interviews 
exclusively to nurses was not a disadvantage and in fact may have provided additional 
focus. Through these two subjects the author was able to access, snowball style (Berg 
1995) seven additional nurses from the critical care units, and one non-critical care 
floor nurse. While not a representative cross section o f UMC nurses, this small 
sample is capable o f  providing accurate and useful information regarding the critical 
care nurse’s experiences with crime and violence. Critical care nurses from the 
following units were interviewed: the trauma E.D., general E.D., trauma Intensive 
Care Unit (ICU), neurological ICU, and medical ICU.
C. SAMPLING PROCEDURES
As an exploratory study (Babbie 1990:53) no attempt was made to select a 
representative sample of nurses. Rather the nurses interviewed were encouraged to 
speak freely about their views and attitudes towards crime and violence. It is 
important to note that as an exploratory study this paper is unable to categorically 
satisfy all the aforementioned research questions. Nevertheless, this study does raise 
new questions, which hopefully can be followed up in a more detailed and controlled 
study.
A pilot interview was first conducted. This sample interview was conducted 
with two nurses at a different Clark County hospital. The subjects indicated to the 
researcher that they basically enjoyed the interview. They expressed interest in the
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questions and the subject. A few format and content suggestions were offered and 
subsequently incorporated into the study.
The interviews with nurses took an average o f  about thirty minutes.
Interviews were conducted at various locations including: two different Starbucks 
Coffee Shops, restaurants, bars and the hospital’s cafeteria. Two interviews were held 
over the phone. The shortest interview was approximately fifteen minutes. The 
longest interview took just over one hour. During this time the author took extensive 
notes. Following the interviews he re-wrote his notes in their entirety, substituting 
pseudonyms for the subject’s real names. Interviews with the UMC director of 
security: four security officers and two Las Metropolitan Police Department officers 
who were assigned to UMC were conducted. These interviews took place at the 
hospital, when it was convenient for the subjects, as not to interfere with their jobs.
Following the completion o f the nursing (N=10) and security department 
(N=5) interviews, the researcher examined certain job-specific questions and the 
subject’s responses. Taking into consideration the small sample, the author was able 
to quantify certain distinctive findings.
The researcher assured the subjects that their responses would be held in the 
strictest o f  confidence. He also assumed the expenses when the interviews were 
conducted in food or drinking establishments. When the interviews were conducted 
over the phone, the author placed the call.
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CHAPTER 4
THE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER
A. UMC HISTORY
The hospital now known as the University Medical Center opened in 1931. 
before the cities o f  Boulder City, North Las Vegas or Henderson even existed. At 
first, the fledgling hospital contained just twenty beds and was staffed by one doctor 
and one nurse (Anderson 1985).
During the Hoover Dam’s construction. Las Vegas’s population began its 
boom. As the need arose, the small hospital, renamed the Clark County Indigent 
Hospital grew. As the demand for medical care continued to increase, the hospital 
began receiving paying patients as well as the indigent. In 1940, the hospital's first 
board o f trustees was elected and, in an effort to accurately reflect its new mission, 
changed its name to the Clark County General Hospital.
Demands on the hospital continued to outpace its growth and by 1943 the 
hospital’s ownership was transferred to the Federal Works Administration. The FWA 
in turn spent nearly $450,000 on new construction for the hospital. At the conclusion 
of World II. Clark County bought the hospital back from the federal government for 
$182,000. (Pugh 1996). By the mid 1960s, the Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital 
(as it was now called) had grown to include the three story circular wing, an 
outpatient building and in 1968 a bum unit. In 1978 the six story medical education
34
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center was built with a $4.5 million dollar federal grant. The seven story patient 
tower was completed in 1979 with the addition of a new obstetrics unit and an 
enlarged bum care unit. In 1986, the hospital’s name was again changed, to the 
University Medical Center o f  Southern Nevada to better reflect its role as a teaching 
institution and a medical center offering complete care (Coughlin 1986).
Prior to the University Medical Center obtaining its trauma center designation 
in 1988, the majority o f the gunshot and stab wound victims in the Las Vegas area 
were being transported to UMC. This occurred partly due to UMC’s proximity to 
North Las Vegas, the location of most o f  the area’s gangs, but also because o f  UM C's 
long history o f  treating poor, uninsured, and indigent people. As the nationwide push 
towards improving trauma care continued, it was the University Medical Center’s 
medical staff who pushed for the trauma center designation. “We were seeing most o f 
the trauma cases anyway,” one physician stated. “Since we were getting pretty good 
at it [trauma] it seemed logical to put in for the designation.”
Initially the trauma center was part o f the main emergency department. In 
1990. two years following the official designation, construction o f the free standing 
trauma and pediatric center was completed.
B. UMC TODAY
Today, the University Medical Center is a very different organization than its 
predecessor. Presently UMC is a bustling metropolitan medical center. Located 
between West Charleston Boulevard and Goldring Avenue (South and North); and 
Shadow Lane and Rancho Drive (East and West), encompassing three square blocks
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are the four primary buildings that comprise the University Medical Center. In 
addition to having the busiest E.D. in Nevada, UM C’s trauma center is fully staffed, 
24 hours a day, 365 days a year with highly trained and skilled personnel. In addition 
to trauma center nurses and technicians, trauma team physicians and specialists are 
also on site 24 hours a day. A CAT Scan and angioplasty suite are available at all 
times, and a surgical team with an operating room (O.R.) is standing by. Following 
surgery, victims o f trauma recover in UM C's specialized trauma intensive care unit 
(ICU).
In 1995. there were 647 registered nurses, 73 licensed practical nurses and 87 
aides and orderlies employed at UMC (see Table 1 ).
Table 1
BREAKDOWN OF UMC STAFF INVOLVED 
IN NURSING
RNs LPNs TOTAL UMC STAFF % NURSING
1992 528 96 2,187 29%*
1993 579 81 2,273 29%
1994 605 77 2,224 31%
1995 647 73 2,259 32%
RNs: Registered Nurses 
LPNs: Licensed Practical Nurses
* All % nursing figures are rounded to nearest percent.
Source: Fiscal Year End Summary Financial Report; Department o f Human 
Resources, Nevada State Health Division. 1992-1995
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
37
Those twenty beds, in 1931 have grown into a health care facility that had 
19,822 admissions in 1995, resulting in an average daily census of 351 inpatients 
(Fiscal Year End Summary Report 1995). These admissions, while not the most for 
any Clark County hospital, are for the most part, the “sickest” o f the Clark County 
patients. Using the only determinant available, average length o f inpatient stay, UMC 
consistently treats patients who require longer hospitalizations (see Table 2).
Table 2
AVERAGE DAILY LENTH OF INPATIENT STAY 
IN CLARK COUNTY HOSPITALS
DESERT ST. MARY’S WASHOE
UMC SUNRISE SPRINGS REGIONAL MED CTR
1992 7.0* 6.5 5.8 5.5 5.8
1993 6.4 6.0 5.7 5.5 5.7
1994 6.1 5.7 5.7 5.4 5.5
1995 6.5 5.3 5.5 5.4 5.2
* All daily figures are rounded to nearest tenth o f day.
Source: Fiscal Year End Summary Financial Report; Department of Human 
Resources, Nevada State Health Division. 1992-1995.
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It is interesting to note that the average inpatient stay for all Clark County 
hospitals is declining. Managed healthcare and subtle pressures on the staff to "move 
em out” may be responsible. The significant increase in the number o f patients 
arriving at the hospital may account for additional nursing stress.
UMC's emergency department is the most active E.D. in Clark County 
receiving over 90,000 visits in 1995 (see Table 3). The second busiest emergency 
department in Clark County is Sunrise Hospital with nearly 50,000 E.D. visits. Those 
annual E.D. visits average out to nearly 250 patients a day (Table 4). Those visits 
breakdown to over 10 patients an hour, or one patient every six minutes. The 90.056 
UMC emergency department visits reflects an 11% increase in E.D. visits since 1992.
Table 3
NUMBER OF YEARLY EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT VISITS 
CLARK COUNTY HOSPITALS
DESERT ST. ROSE
UMC SUNRISE SPRINGS DOMINICAN
1992 80,767 49,369 31,815 19,209
1993 84,499 54.622 36,848 22,008
1994 89,275 59,150 39,572 22,225
1995 90,056 64,854 31,147 22,641
Source: Fiscal Year End Summary Utilization Reports; Department of Human 
Resources, Nevada State Health Division. 1992-1995.
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Table 4
DAILY AVERAGE NUMBER OF E.D. VISITS 
CLARK COUNTY HOSPITALS
DESERT ST. ROSE
UMC SUNRISE SPRINGS DOMINICAN
1992 221* 135 87 52
1993 232 150 101 60
1994 245 162 108 61
1995 247 178 85 62
* All daily figures are rounded to nearest whole number
Source: Fiscal Year End Summary Utilization Reports; Department o f  Human 
Resources, Nevada State Health Division. 1992-1995.
UMC's trauma department, while not nearly as frequented as the general 
emergency department, treats the county’s most seriously injured patients. In 1994 
(the most recent year official Nevada State trauma data is available), UMC received 
3,711 serious trauma cases via police car, ambulance, private vehicle or helicopter 
(see table #5).
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Table 5
BREAKDOWN OF TRAUMA PATIENTS 
TRANSPORTED TO UMC
BLUNT
TOTAL # PENETRATING VEHICULAR FALLS/ETC
CC # % # % # %
1989 1.336 279 21%* 717 54%* 340 25%*
1990 2,423 491 20% 1,302 54% 630 26%
1991 2.696 597 22% 1,423 53% 676 25%
1992 2,649 575 21% 1,454 55% 620 23%
1993 3.458 780 22% 1,948 56% 730 21%
1994 3.711 863 23% 2,057 55% 791 21%
♦All percentages rounded to nearest percent.
Source: 1994. 1993.1990 Annual Trauma Reports; Department o f Human 
Resources, Nevada State Health Division.
O f these 3,711 victims the majority (2,848 or 77%) were categorized as blunt 
trauma. These blunt trauma patients were most frequently injured in motor vehicle 
accidents (MVAs). In fact, 55% o f all trauma center patients in 1994 were the result 
o f MVAs. Twenty-one percent o f the victims received their injuries in falls or 
miscellaneous accidents. The remaining 863 trauma center patients (23%) were 
victims o f  penetrating trauma. Penetrating trauma is the result o f either stabbing or
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gunshot wounds (GSWs). It is significant to note that while all trauma patient 
categories have increased dramatically, the percentage o f  penetrating injuries has 
increased 209% while vehicular related injuries increased 187% and falls etc. 
increased 133%.
C. ECONOMICS
To say that the University Medical Center has had a tumultuous economic 
history would be an understatement. As the only public hospital in Clark County. 
UMC is obligated to treat and admit all patients requiring medical care. In the cases 
o f non-paying patients who arrive on the doorsteps o f private hospitals, these patients 
are [supposedly] treated in the emergency department, but without insurance or the 
ability to pay. are then transferred to UMC for admission. To assist with indigent 
care, in 1996, the State o f Nevada provided UMC with $15 million dollars. At the 
same time, Clark County contributed $7.1 million dollars (Schweers 1996:8A). One 
additional subsidy is a Clark County property tax that raises approximately $4.2 
million dollars for emergency room assistance (ERA Funds). Ironically, without 
subsidies, UMC for the fiscal year ending June 30“’, 1996, still showed a small profit 
o f $53,857 (see Table 6).
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Table 6
UMC REVENUES: WITH AND WITHOUT OUTSIDE 
INCOME AND GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
INCOME (LOSS) PROFIT (LOSS) OF ALL
FROM OPERATIONS* REVENUE OVER EXPENSES**
1992 +1,050,698 +6,613,364
1993 +1,887952 +5,590,487
1994 (22,293,282) (9,552,069)
1995 (17,071,557) ( 827,394)
1996 + 53,857 +21,540,819
* Does not Include outside income, Nevada, or Clark County subsidies. 
** Including outside incomes, Nevada and Clark County subsidies.
Source: UMC Controller’s Office, Fiscal Services.
In 1994 and 1995, including subsidies, UMC still posted losses totaling over 
$10 million dollars. Though in 1992 and 1993, profits o f  over a million dollars, prior 
to [smaller] government subsidies, were recorded each year. The dramatic turnaround 
is often credited to William Hale, UMC’s chief executive officer. While Hale gives 
public credit to the County Commission for its leadership and support, and his UMC 
staff for their energy and dedication; it was widely reported that Hale’s pursuit o f 
contracts with managed [health] care corporations and his success advertising for 
paying patients was the key to UMC’s recent fiscal rebound (Schweers 1996).
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As the only trauma center in Southern Nevada, trauma patients o f all types are 
transported to UMC as per protocol by the Mercy Ambulance Company, Henderson 
and Boulder City Fire Departments. Many people in the higher economic strata may 
view the University Medical Center as the hospital o f last resort, and would not go 
there willingly in a medical emergency (Schweers 1996). However, they will find 
themselves transported there after sustaining traumatic injuries. O f the 3,711 trauma 
patients UMC received in 1994,23 percent (or 863) o f  those were patients who were 
victims of firearm or stabbing injuries. The other 77 percent o f  UMC’s trauma 
patients were either victims o f  motor vehicle accidents (2,057 or 55 percent) or falls 
and other non categorized injuries (791 or 21 percent); (Table 5); (Annual Trauma 
Report 1994:54).
While these firearm and stabbing victims are extremely expensive to treat and 
most victims are non or under-insured (Headden 1996:34; Skolnick 1992:2994; 
Wagner 1990:23); in Clark County, they are outnumbered by automobile and other 
accident victims, who for the most part are insured. Hospitals may lose money 
treating the penetrating trauma victims, but these costs can be offset if the majority of 
the trauma patients have insurance. It is reported that a blunt trauma/penetrating 
trauma injury ratio o f 4:1 has been defined as a healthy mix financially for the 
viability o f most trauma programs (Laskowski-Jones 1993:123). UMC currently 
maintains the ratio o f approximately 4.5:1 o f blunt to penetrating injury patients. Yet 
the UMC trauma center is not making a financial profit. This report does not contain 
specific breakdowns o f  reimbursement rates for various patient categories 
(blunt/penetrating), but overall profit (loss) figures are available.
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Tables 7, 8 and 9. show the fiscal breakdown o f UMC’s emergency 
department and trauma service since 1994.
Table 7
1994 EMERGENCY AND TRAUMA DEPARTMENT 
FINANCIAL BREAKDOWNS
EMERGENCY TRAUMA TOTAL
ACTUAL COST $14,947,155 $36.704.943 $51.652,098
TO PROVIDE CARE:
WHAT UMC CHARGED: 31,467.694 49.938,698 81.406,392
WHAT UMC EXPECTED 11,583,727 29,320,633 40,904.360
TO COLLECT:
OPERATING PROFIT/LOSS: -3,363,428 -7,384.310 -10,747.738
Source: UMC Controller’s Office, Fiscal Services.
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Table 8
1995 EMERGENCY AND TRAUMA DEPARTMENT 
FINANCIAL BREAKDOWNS
EMERGENCY TRAUMA TOTAL
ACTUAL COST $12,027.241 $48,920.264 $60.947.505
TO PROVIDE CARE:
WH.AT UMC CHARGED: 35,167,371 61,073.988 96,241,359
WHAT UMC EXPECTED 12,629.487 34,480,354 47.109.841
TO COLLECT:
OPERATING PROFIT/LOSS: +602,246 -14,439,910 -13,837,664
Source: UMC Controller’s Office, Fiscal Services.
Table 9
1996 EMERGENCY AND TRAUMA DEPARTMENT 
FINANCIAL BREAKDOWNS
EMERGENCY TRAUMA TOTAL
ACTUAL COST $12,802,627 $59,451,668 $72.254.295
TO PROVIDE CARE:
WHAT UMC CHARGED: 39,151,764 68,571,705 107,723,469
WHAT UMC EXPECTED 14,027,666 36,055,293 50.082.959
TO COLLECT:
OPERATING PROFIT/LOSS: +1,225,039 -23,396,375 -22,171.336
Source: UMC Controller’s Office, Fiscal Services.
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The emergency department has rebounded from a $3.3 million loss in 1994. to 
show a profit o f $1.2 million for 1996. In contrast, the trauma service has deficits 
increasing from $10,7 million for 1994 to $22.1 million for 1996.
An interesting analysis o f cost shifting efforts from 1994 to 1996. reveals the 
emergency department increased its WHAT UMC CHARGED dramatically 
compared to ACTUAL COST TO PROVIDE CARE (see Table 10). In 1994. the 
emergency department via cost-shifting billed patients 110% above the actual cost to 
provide their care. These cost-shifting efforts still resulted in a $3.3 million dollar 
loss. However in 1995 and 1996, the emergency department billed patients 190% and 
205% respectively over the actual cost to provide care. These cost-shifting efforts 
resulted in a $602 thousand and $1.2 million net surplus respectively for 1995 and 
1996.
On the other hand, a detailed analysis o f  UMC’s trauma center charges 
(WHAT UMC CHARGED) versus actual costs o f providing care (ACTUAL COST 
TO PROVIDE CARE), for the 1994, 1995, and 1996 years show a decreasing trend of 
cost-shifting (see Table 10). In 1994 the trauma service charged 36% over the actual 
costs o f providing care. This overcharge still resulted in a net loss o f $7.3 million.
But. for some inexplicable reason the trauma center did not attempt to increase their 
cost shifting percentages. Instead, they decreased their cost-shifting overcharges to 
24% in 1995, and to 15% in 1996. This resulted in even more significant net losses o f 
$14.4 and $23.3 million for 1995 and 1996 years respectively.
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Table 10
EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT AND TRAUMA CENTER 
COST-SHIFTING % vs. PROFIT 1994-1996
EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT
OVERCHARGE % NET TLOSSI/PROFIT
1994 110%* $(3,363,428)
1995 190% + 602.246
1996 205% +1,225,039
TRAUMA CENTER
OVERCHARGE % NET (LOSSI/PROFIT
1994 36% $( 7,384,310)
1995 24% (14,439,910)
1996 15% (23.396,375)
* All percentages are rounded to nearest whole number.
Source: UMC Controller’s Office, Fiscal Services.
As Table 11 shows, the emergency department and the trauma center's 
combined accrued losses from 1994 to 1996 have increased from $10.7 million to 
$22.1 million (106%). During the same period, however, UMC’s hospital-wide 
losses have been reduced and a small profit has been identified.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
48
Table 11
COMPARISON OF OVERALL HOSPITAL REVENUES VERSUS TR.AUMA 
CENTER AND EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT REVENUES 1994-1996
OVERALL HOSPITAL EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT
INCOME (LOSS) FROM AND TRAUMA CENTER
OPERATIONS* INCOME (LOSS)
1994 (22.293,282) (10,747,738)
1995 (17,071,557) (13,837,664)
1996 + 53,857 (22,171,336)
* Does not include outside income, Nevada or Clark County subsidies. 
Sources: UMC Controller’s office, Fiscal Services.
The economic cost o f violent crime is staggering - as are the costs resulting 
from automobile accidents, heart disease and cancer. While UMC’s trauma center is 
losing a considerable amount o f money treating patients suffering from gunshot and 
stab injuries, in addition to victims from motor vehicle accidents; the emergency 
department does not seem to be as negatively affected. Ultimately, the trauma 
center's financial deficit does not seem to be adversely affecting the hospital’s overall 
financial recovery.
It would be interesting to reexamine the University Medical Center, if. for 
instance. UMC ever lost its exclusive trauma center monopoly. Even though the 
trauma center is losing considerable amounts o f money, its financial status could be
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even worse. Many o f the more cost efficient and profitable motor vehicle injury 
patients would now have a choice o f hospital selection. The cost inefficient patients 
(shooting and stabbings) would still be transported to UMC by virtue o f  North Las 
Vegas being in a closer proximity to UMC; while the more profitable motor vehicle 
accident patients may be ultimately transported elsewhere.
D. THE SECURITY DEPARTMENT
The UMC security staff is not only responsible for the four main buildings on 
campus, but also for the nine buildings that comprise the outpatient clinics, physician 
offices and QuickCare centers. Presently there are 37 full and part time security 
officers employed. The department’s current budget is $1,613,294 a year. Table 12 
shows an increasing budget from 1994, though security chief Mike Parker informs 
this researcher that he is being instructed to cut 10% from his budget for the 
upcoming fiscal year.
Table 12
UMC SECURITY DEPARTMENT ANNUAL BUDGET
1994 $1,333,602
1995 $1,573,896
1996 $1,613,294
Source: UMC Controller’s Office, Fiscal Services.
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While UMC does not have any formal security checkpoints or metal detectors. 
Parker stresses that most o f the high pressure areas (such as the E.D.'s; Trauma 
Recess; and ICUs) have two doors and keypad coded locks. As for the types o f 
patients that Parker believes pose the greatest physical threat to the s ta ff s safety he 
believes they are, “the mental patients, drug induced patients and the alcoholics.” A 
new security officer, with about one year o f  experience agrees, “It’s a draw. The drug 
O.D.s and the drunks are bad,” he says pausing for a moment, “but the mental patients 
might be the most dangerous.”
Many o f the problems with visitors to the hospital, specifically in the E.D., 
revolve around extended waiting times. As a more experienced officer elaborated, "it 
could be the wait. Or sometimes they're unhappy with the way their friend or family 
member is being treated.” It is interesting to note that there is not as much trouble in 
the Recess waiting room as there is with the general emergency department. And not 
nearly as much trouble with the patients in Recess. As the young security officer 
explained, “most o f the trouble takes place in the main E.D. Trauma doesn’t get as 
many problems because the patients there, are really legitimately hurt. They usually 
want or need help.”
Even though just about every casino, supermarket and 7-11 has armed security
officers, Parker is proud that his staff does not carry guns.
We’re a health care facility. And thankfully, we haven’t gotten to the 
point where we’re a police force. We try to use passive means to assure 
safety. We have a formal non-violent crisis intervention training program.
I'he only weapon we carry is pepper foam. That’s like pepper spray, but it 
doesn’t get into the ventilation system when it’s used. If it’s necessary, 
someone comes into the hospital with a weapon, for example, we cordon 
off the area and call Metro.
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Not all o f UMC’s security officers share Parker's views. One officer
expressed his reservations,
1 think we need more protection. People see us and know we don’t 
carry weapons. Unless you're a big guy like myself, many people 
think you can just talk over or not obey the officer. 1 think we should 
be better armed, maybe even have a canine unit.
One older security officer forcefully stressed, “without Metro being here, we'd
all be carrying weapons.”
The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (Metro) is located nearby. In
fact, a Metro officer is on duty twenty-four hours a day at UMC. The officer is
usually stationed at the entrance to the adult emergency department. A Metro
substation, complete with a cell, had been physically inside the hospital at one time.
But when the E.D. was expanded five years ago the officer and substation were
removed. Following a near riot between rival gang members outside the hospital
three summers ago, UMC agreed to pay the salary o f the Metro detail, and the officers
were reassigned shortly thereafter. The cost for the Metro detail comes out o f the
security department budget - roughly $37,000 a quarter, or about $148,000 a year; just
over 9% o f the overall annual security department budget..
One Metro officer on duty explained,
Metros return wasn’t due specifically to one incident. It was a 
combination o f events. The growth o f the town, increases in crime and 
drive-bys [shootings], and a high number o f non-reported [to the police] 
batteries that were coming to the hospital. The hospital then had to deal 
with them. Usually by calling us.
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According to the Federal Bureau o f Investigation’s Uniformed Crime Reports, 
the number o f  aggravated assaults in the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 
Jurisdiction increased nearly 170% from 1990 to 1994 (see table 13).
Table 13
NUMBER OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULTS REPORTED 
TO THE POLICE 1990-1994
1990 1,831
1991 1,932
1992 1,926
1993 3,183
1994 4,934
Source: FBI, Uniformed Crime Reports, 1990-1994.
Current Metro duties include providing security back-up, making arrests if
required, and taking whatever official pm lice reports are necessary. “The Metro
officer will go anywhere in the hospital that the police need to be involved.”
At one time four additional hospital security officers employed by the hospital,
but their positions were cut when the Metro police officer was permanently reassigned
to UMC. According to Parker, “we lost those officers when the Metro officer came
back. And as great as it is to have the Metro guy right downstairs, he doesn’t do
security work. He doesn’t really patrol or do security checks.”
When asked about optimum staffing, Parker is mostly content,
if I could have whatever staff I could have.... hmmm... all I really want 
is my four full time officers back. If I could get those guys back I could be 
more proactive. I'd  like to have one officer on duty at all times just patrol-
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ling. Like a neighborhood cop. Roving to all the nurses stations, chatting 
for a few minutes, getting to know the people.
This roving and chatting is what one senior security officer describes as the
security department’s main function, “though we write a lot o f reports, mainly for
property investigations, the functions we do most is keeping people going the right
way. information and crowd control.”
Parker believes that there is a perception problem with his security
department, which is why he very much wants the replaced officers back.
As it stands now, the officers patrol. But the staff doesn’t really 
think that we do. The nurses don’t feel we provide the service. But 
the nurses don’t really see us. We’re there - but not seen. W e've be­
come part o f the background. Which is why it’s important to get that 
extra officer. This way he’ll to be able to stop and interact with the staff.
In addition to the extra security officers, Parker would like to have upgrades
for some o f his older equipment. Radios, computers, alarm systems, cameras and
panic buttons for all locations are on the ch iefs wish list. But with impending budget
cuts looming, Parker is not sure he will be able to purchase them.
There is this silent alarm locator system that I would love to get. The 
system consists o f  a beeper that each member o f  the staff would carry on 
their person. In an emergency, the staff could activate the pager and it 
would send a distress message to the dispatch center, alerting an officer 
to the location o f the person requesting help.
There are no formal policies on workplace assaults or dangerous situations. While
some written policies are in the works, security has a number o f unwritten policies. It
is commonly known throughout the security department that if  someone intentionally
assaults a staff member, it’s considered assault and they call Metro. According to
Parker,
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we used to be more forgiving about some o f these assaults a few 
years ago. If the person who assaulted the staff member came back, 
and apologized, he was drunk, upset, no one got too badly hurt, some­
times we’d let it slide. But since we’ve had so many more incidents and 
the place has gotten so large, w e’ve been unable to do that anymore.
Prior to 1994 (Parker becoming chief) the security records system was very
different, and as such not an accurate representation o f security activities. Table 14 is
a breakdown o f the number o f  incident reports written by UMC security officers from
1994 to 1996. Table 15 reflects a division o f security incident reports from 1994 to
1996 analyzed by type and percentage. While not representative of all securit)-
activities, a clearer sense o f  roles and responsibilities are provided. It is important to
note, however, that many official job responsibilities and actions are not listed in this
table. In fact many incident reports may never be written. For example, i f  a security
officer is notified o f a disturbance on the fourth floor o f  the hospital, but by the time
the officer arrives the situation is under control and not requiring further security
involvement, the officer will simply note in his personal log book his response. A
formal incident report o f the request for security will not be filed.
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Table 14
YEARLY TOTALS OF INCIDENT REPORTS FOR THE 
UMC SECURITY DEPARTMENT 1994-1996
Source: UMC Security Department Figures.
TYPE OF INCIDENT REPORT 1994 1995 1996
INJURY: (pt, visitor, employee) 21 20 19
ASSAULTS ON STAFF (1995, 1996 only) 8 11
BURGLARY (building, auto) 6 11 9
VEHICLE ACCIDENT 20 25 13
TOWED VEHICLE 20 33 20
DRUG/ALCOHOL 10 7 6
PROPERTY DAMAGE 5 10 14
SPECIALIZED INFO ONLY 26 42 27
DISTURBANCES (pt, visitor, employee) 27 29 22
MISSING PROPERTY PERSONAL 93 91 72
MISSING PROPERTY FACILITY 35 37 39
ROBBERY (1995, 1996 only) 2 3
VANDALISM (vehicles) 16 11 10
SUICIDE 2 0 1
THREAT/ BOMB 3 1 0
THREAT/OTHER 9 7 13
TRESPASSING 22 32 35
VANDALISM (facility) 19 5 1
WEAPONS POSSESSION 1 0 1
SECURITY ALARMS 1 1 0
SECURITY OPERATIONS (1995,1996 only) 1 2
SECURITY OBSERVATIONS (1995,1996 only) 15 11
COMPLAINTS 5 9 4
FIRES 6 5 11
PROCEDURE/POLICY VIOLATIONS 5 8 3
BREAKING/ENTERING 16 7 16
TOTAL # SECURITY REPORTS 382 417 363
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Table 15
PERCENTAGE OF INCIDENT REPORTS FOR THE UMC SECURITY 
DEPARTMENT BY TYPE IN 1994-1996
TYPE OF INCIDENT REPORT PERCENTAGE OF REPORTS
MISSING PROPERTY PERSONAL 22%*
MISSING PROPERTY FACILITY 10%
TRESPASSING 8%
SPECIALIZED INFO ONLY 8%
DISTURBANCES 7%
INJURIES 5%
TOWED VEHICLES 4%
VEHICLE ACCIDENT 5%
VEHICLE VANDALISM 3%
BREAKING AND ENTERING 4%
PROPERTY DAMAGE 4%
THREAT/ OTHER 3%
ASSAULT ON STAFF 2%**
ALL OTHER REPORTS 17%
TOTAL % OF SECURITY REPORTS 100%
* All figures are rounded to nearest whole percent.
** Adjusted to reflect 1995 and 1996 years only.
Source: UMC Security Department Figures.
In 1995, there were 8 hospital staff members assaulted. 11 staff members 
were assaulted in 1996. Though assaults are obviously a concern, they are not the
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usual reason people get arrested at UMC. The most frequent charge resulting in an
arrest is trespassing. According to one Metro officer,
usually the person refused a warning to leave the premises. We usually 
try to warn them first. Then we issue a citation [like a ticket]. But if  the 
visitor gets too upset and begins creating a disturbance, and they still refuse 
to leave, then they get arrested.
Another non-written official policy which is common knowledge is the
practice o f  not putting two different gang members in the same unit or ward. And
while staff concerns about gang members frequently arise, Parker is not as concerned.
Gang people are not as much of threat as most people think. We’ve had more 
incidents involving mental patients and drug/alcohol abusers. More security 
time and effort is spent with those patients, and not the gang members. 
Sometimes it’s tough to tell who the gang members are. Frequently people get 
stereotyped incorrectly. It could be a high-school kid, wearing baggy pants, or 
a funny hat, and he gets called a gang member.
Security department records confirm Parker’s beliefs. In fact, very few o f the 
disturbances listed in Table 14 were gang related. Over the past three years only four 
of the listed seventy-eight disturbances reports filed were identified as gang related.
Another Metro officer who has worked the UMC post on and off for a couple 
o f years adds,
sometimes there are gangs here. Tension between gangs occurs 
occasionally. Guys flashing signs, talking smack. Usually you tell the 
gang people you can send one representative or family member to the 
hospital. Or else we’ll come in with our gang unit. Sometimes the gang 
unit will come to the hospital on their own in an effort to ID new gang 
members.
While there have not been any reports o f  people following someone to UMC 
to finish them offm the ways Washington D.C. has recently experienced [D.C. Man 
Dies After Being Shot at SW Gas Station and Hospital (Constable 1996); D.C.
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Ambulance Shooting Intensifies Workers’ Fears (Pierre & Vogel 1996); Fatal
Shooting in Hospital Emergency Room (NY Times 1996)] most o f  the security and
police persormel, while doubting that will happen here, acknowledges the possibility.
Parker points out that Recess and E.D.’s are duel access (2 locked doors) and a
security officer is stationed at both front doors. “Upstairs there may not be as many
officers. So depending upon the situation we may put a security officer on that floor.”
One tactic the hospital uses to prevent such an occurrence is categorizing
certain patients as NFP (not for publication). When a patient is NFPed, the hospital
doesn't release their name, use their real name on any written charts or documents.
and screens visitors closely according to a predetermined list o f  acceptable guests.
The NFP code is used quite frequently. Any victim o f violence may have that label
attached. Domestic abuse victims, sexual assault victims and gang members are often
labeled NFP. “Anyone who we might think, or their family thinks, might be at
additional risk can be NFP’ed.”
Another security tactic initiated four years ago, though not used as frequently
as the NFP. is known as Lockdown. When the hospital is undergoing lockdown, all
available security officers are assigned to guard all the entrances, physically lock
certain units, escort staff to their cars, and prevent anyone not directly involved in
patient care or administrative duties from entering the hospital. A discrete flashing
red light mounted outside the trauma and pediatric center warns staff o f a lockdown
condition. According to Parker,
Lockdown is used only once a month or so. It’s more precautionary than 
necessary. A couple o f summers ago it was more frequent than it is now.
Once in a while, following a drive-by shooting, or gang shooting, we’ll
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go on Lockdown for an hour or so. Just to see if anything develops. If 
nothing does, we'll rescind it.
While Lockdowns and escorting the staff to their cars are dramatic and scary,
Parker downplays such events,
our biggest crime problem is an internal one. There isn’t as much 
crime against the hospital (employees stealing hospital property), but 
crimes against persons. Someone steals a radio, or $10 from a room, 
or a patient. Personal stuff. Occasionally there are small groups of 
people who come into the hospital looking for easy access to stuff.
They walk up and down halls, checking doors, desks. It becomes an 
opportunity thing. We’re always going around telling staff to: lock 
their doors; put their purses in the back o f a deep drawer; lock 
your desk. It’s difficult to accurately determine the extent o f this 
criminal activity, because frequently it isn’t reported.
Without question more security reports are filed for missing personal property 
than any other category. Missing facility property usually runs a close second. In fact 
when one combines the missing personal property reports and missing facility 
property reports, for the past three years, one finds that nearly 32 percent o f all 
incident reports filed are property related. In comparison, if  you were to add up all 
the reports o f  disturbances, threats against persons, assaults, burglaries, robberies, 
weapons possession and breaking and entering, the combined totals would still barely 
top 15 percent o f all reports. Incidents specifically involving vehicles (accidents on 
UMC property, towed vehicles and vandalism) accounted for 12 percent o f all reports. 
Security operations, documenting injuries (not assaults), assisting visitors with 
specialized information, property vandalism and a host o f other lesser known 
functions round out the remaining 39 percent o f security reports.
The latest security activity just starting to be tracked (not included in the 
above listings), is the number o f times security is requested by the medical staff to
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restrain a patient. Restraining patients may be necessary for any number o f  reasons. 
The patient may be disoriented by a medical condition such as Alzheimer's disease or 
strokes; medically unstable and requiring emergency care; under the influence of 
drugs or alcohol, or just plain violent. Table 16 shows the first trackable data on the 
number o f patients restrained.
Table 16
NUMBER OF PATIENTS THE UMC SECURITY DEPARTMENT 
IS INVOLVED IN RESTRAINING
DEC. 1996 153
JAN. 1997 176
FEB. 1997 152
Source: UMC Security Department figures.
One of Parker’s biggest complaints is his inability to do thorough background
checks on prospective hospital employees,
because o f privacy laws we can only get access to felony convictions.
Not misdemeanors, not felony arrests pleaded down to misdemeanors.
We could have people working here with 10 or 15 arrests or 
misdemeanor convictions for petty theft and I don’t get to know it.
Finally, Parker describes the trends in hospital security as if  they were a
pendulum.
it swings one way then another. People get very high on this or that 
concept, whether it be metal detectors or armed security officers, and 
for a while that’s how things are done. Then it swings back, and people 
say we need to be kinder, gentler, more understanding, and that’s the 
way it gets done for a while. It's a reflection o f  the community. Depend­
ing upon its mood.
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E. THE NURSING STAFF
The nursing s taff s views o f hospital safety issues clearly revolve around their 
day-to-day interactions with violent or potentially violent patients. Their experience 
treating large numbers o f victims o f violence also effects their outlooks. The 
following excerpts from staff interviews display the attitudes, experiences and 
concerns o f the nurses who are exposed to the most serious, dangerous, and volatile 
hospital workplace environments - the critical care units. These units include the 
emergency department, trauma resuscitation imit, and intensive care units. The 
following five nurses are highlighted:
Cindy* has been a registered nurse for five years. She has worked at UMC for 
the past six years (one year as a licensed practical nurse). Cindy works day shifts and 
is assigned to the Neurological Intensive Care Unit (Neuro ICU), which is located on 
the third floor o f the main hospital.
Gary has worked the day shift at UMC for the past three years. He has always 
worked in the trauma center which is located on the first floor o f  the trauma and 
pediatric building. The trauma E.D. is also called Recess, which is short for 
resuscitation.
Penny has also worked at UMC for the past three years. Her first two years 
were in the Trauma ICU. This past year Penny has been working the 3pm to 3am
* All names are fictitious.
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shift in Recess.
Nina has been a nurse for seven years, but she has only been at UMC for the 
past six months. Nina works the 3am to 3pm shift and is assigned to the Trauma ICU. 
which is also on the first floor o f the trauma and pediatric building. Previously, Nina 
worked in the emergency department o f a trauma center in Texas.
Wendy has been a  nurse for five years and has worked at UMC for the past 
four. At first, Wendy worked on a med/surg floor. For the past three years she has 
worked on the first floor o f  the main building, in the adult E.D. mostly on the night 
shift.
All o f the nursing staff interviewed (N=10) reported being threatened by 
patients or visitors to the hospital in one manner or another.
“I’ve been threatened bunches o f times by patients and visitors,” says Penny.
"Threatened? Sure!,” says Gary. He add, “I’ve also been punched, scratched, 
bitten, slammed up against the wall, things like that.”
"Hell,” says Wendy, “sometimes I think. Oh God, if  one more drug addict 
grabs, shoves or spits at me, maybe I’ll assault him.”
These types o f physical encounters have become so commonplace to the staff 
at UMC that most o f the nurses don’t even consider them assaults. Initially, Cindy 
admitted to being assaulted on the job  only once. She was stabbed in the arm by a 
patient who had hidden a syringe in her pocket. After a probe asking whether she had 
ever been punched or hit Cindy answered, “oh yea! o f course, many times.” Being hit
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or shoved by patients is so commonplace, that most o f the time Cindy didn’t even 
consider those to be like real assaults.
There are no security check points or metal detectors at UMC. “I wish there 
were,” says Gary, “I'm  sure the whole staff wishes there were.”
Weapons do enter UMC much to the dismay o f the staff. Cindy elaborates, 
“security is supposed to confiscate weapons when they [patients] come through the
E.D. But that doesn't always happen. Another problem is that friends o f  patients 
occasionally bring weapons into the hospital for the patients.
Penny recalls treating a number o f patients who rolled in the door with 
weapons.
one time these two guys rolled in at the same time. They had been 
fighting, I don’t know about what. One guy stabbed the other. And 
then the stabbed guy shot the stabber. By the time both got here they 
were pretty bad. They didn’t even realize we took their toys away 
from them.
For most of the staff, (9 of 10) the presence o f patients or visitors with
weapons is commonplace. Only Nina has not encountered patients with weapons but
she is expecting that to happen eventually.
Every nurse interviewed (N=10) reported having to call for help numerous
times since they’ve worked at UMC because o f threats or actual violence against
them. A basic pattern o f  coworker response develops. According to the nurses, the
first line o f defense is usually a good loud yell. Penny explains,
usually there are a lot o f people around in Recess. And everyone is 
pretty quick to respond if you let out a yell. Other nurses and docs 
come running. The paramedics and firemen are great. They come 
running if you shout out. Then security shows up. Then Metro if 
you still need help.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
6 4
Wendy agrees, “there are always people in the main E.D. I don’t think I've
ever had a problem when a  few people didn’t come over immediately.’’
Calling for help is not as easy for all UMC nurses at all times. Cindy
occasionally works by herself in the Neuro ICU and shouting might not bring help.
Cindy has also reported to security a number of incidents regarding visitors to her unit
who were carrying many types o f weapons, guns included. Penny admits that she was
more worried about her safety when she worked in the Trauma ICU, then now that
she works in Recess,
in the Recess area there are always a lot o f security and police around.
But in the back ICU areas, or upstairs on the floors, there’s less 
security. Less staff, less police and less traffic in general. If something 
would happen, I might not have been able to get help fast. And that 
used to worry me.
In addition to physically yelling for help, the staff can access security by other 
means. Calling security by phone is the most common way o f accessing extra help. 
There are panic buttons located in a few o f  the sensitive areas o f the hospital. The 
emergency room, main waiting room, pediatric emergency room, and psychiatric 
center are hard wired with panic buttons. The security department hopes to get the 
rest o f the hospital wired eventually. The hospital’s phone system has a direct line to 
the securit)' department and a special number, that when dialed, transmits the phone 
call directly to the security officer’s radio. But not a single nurse this researcher 
spoke with was aware o f that option.
The absence o f official policies or written procedures for dealing with violent 
or dangerous persons is surprising. The security department claims that some policies
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are “in the works” but nothing currently exists. Which is interesting since most o f the
staff interviewed believed there were some sort o f official policy. While nearly
everyone thought there was a policy - “the hospital has policies for everything,” - no
one could recall anything specific from this supposed policy.
Possibly the most well known unofficial - official - policy is in the treatment
of patients the staff perceives to be at additional risk. Gang members, for example,
may be subject to retaliation or additional assault by rival gang members while in the
hospital. Penny describes some o f the tactics the hospital does differently when a
gang shooting or incident has occurred,
the hospital flags the gang member’s chart with an NFP. That stands 
for not for publication. It’s designed to not tell people that someone 
is in the hospital. But that doesn’t really work, since everyone knows 
this is where the shooting victims get taken. After the kid is admitted, 
the parents are supposed to fill out a form specifying the five or six 
people allowed to visit. We try to enforce that. And if  tension is really 
running high, we have a condition called lockdown. During lockdown: 
all the extra doors are locked, extra security and Metro arrive, and the 
nurses and staff are escorted to their cars by the police or security. Just 
having to need that can be pretty scary.
While the security department believes that persons with mental illness 
present the most credible threat to staff safety, none o f the nurses interviewed agreed. 
The two types o f  patients the nurses predominantly (9 o f 10) feel affect their safety 
and security are the gang members and persons under the influence o f drugs or 
alcohol. Gang members seem to be the obvious, first choice as a potential patient 
threat. As Gary quipped, “the gangbangers who’ve been in here three times are a lot 
more o f a threat than the little old lady who fell and broke her hip.”
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As Cindy explains.
I’ve had the Skinheads, the Latino and black gangs in here too. They 
come up here in a very threatening manner and start demanding things. 
They tiy to order the staff around. And if  you don’t snap to it, they can 
get very loud. They’re rude and disruptive to the staff. And disruptive 
to the other patients as well.
While most nurses interviewed (8 o f 10) expressed concerns when gang 
members were in the hospital, nearly all (9 o f  10) critical care nurses agreed that the 
alcohol and drug related patients present the most common threat to their safety. Nina 
explains, “it’s the drug or alcohol abusers who aren’t critically injured who wake up 
in my unit withdrawing or behaving violently that pose the greatest threat.” And 
while Nina doesn’t admit to be overtly scared, there is a  degree o f  nervousness that 
she expresses, “ it isn 't really fear. It’s sort o f  a nervousness. You’re always aware 
that something could happen. It probably won’t, but it could.”
Gary thinks that the drunks might be the hardest types o f  patient to treat, “they 
don’t know what’s happening to them. And they don’t care.”
Wendy agrees, “you try to help them, but most really good drunks don’t want 
your help.”
Penny believes that the while the drunks are occasionally trouble, the drugged
out patients, especially those on PC? and Angel Dust, pose the greatest threat to her
safety. And while Penny is concerned for her safety, she is hesitant to say so. She
phrases her statement carefully,
it’s more o f  an awareness thing. You’re aware o f  the possibility 
that violence could occur at any minute. So you’re better prepared 
to handle it. If you think something’s up, you call security over, or 
the police, or just ask someone to standby and give you a hand.
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Cindy believes the increase in violence against nursing staff stems from a
general lack o f respect.
It’s funny. I felt safer when I worked [as a nurse] in the jails, then 1 do 
working at UMC right now. When I was working with the prisoners 1 
was their only source o f help. So they were more respectful and polite.
More polite and respectful than the guards, that’s for sure. At the 
hospital, you're just one o f many people who are supposed to help. And 
patients and family feel that you have to do whatever they want, when 
they want. And they can get pretty upset when you don’t.
Cindy’s feeling o f not being safe at UMC is not an isolated occurrence. It is 
important to note that when Cindy started at UMC she did feel safe. But after five 
years o f  incidents she no longer feels that security is adequate. And she does not feel 
that the hospital is at all concerned about her personal safety. As to when she 
specifically feels unsafe at work Cindy says, “it depends on what type o f patient and 
visitors are in my unit.”
Gaiy concurs,
when I first started working here [UMC] I felt that security was adequate 
I didn’t know any better at first. There was a  security officer right outside 
the door. But now, no. I don’t think security is adequate. Many times 
Recess gets the officer who is assigned light duty. Crowd control is the 
biggest security problem. It isn’t always the overt violence, but a general 
safety thing. Or lack o f safety thing.
Gary is also convinced that the medical center doesn’t care about staff safety. 
“Everything comes down to money. And unless it [keeping staff safe] directly affects 
the big people in the hospital, they don’t care.”
Penny, Nina and Wendy are not as critical. While Nina feels “basically
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safe” she does not believe the hospital is that concerned for her personal safety.
Penny also feels basically safe. Primarily because hospital security and a Metro
officer are nearby. Depending upon the type of patient Wendy is treating she usually
feels safe enough to do her job without too many worries. While not 100% confident
that the hospital is overly concerned with her safety, Wendy has this to say about the
security department.
for the most part, most o f the security officers are good guys. 1 think 
many o f  the officers try to do a good job. O.K., I'll admit it, there are 
a few o f  them who are really pretty lazy. But some are pretty solid too.
I think most o f the Metro guys are pretty good too.
There are no official classes or orientations regarding violence or dangerous
situations for the new nurse employed at UMC. None o f the nurses interviewed could
recall any instruction from management or supervisors regarding such incidents.
There were no formal training classes to prepare us for workplace 
violence. Nothing on personal safety. There is something now, a class 
on non-violent crisis something or another, but it's on your own time.
You don 't get paid for it. So almost no one goes to it.
Medically, the toughest patients to treat are what staff calls the full traumas.
Gunshot wounds to the chest and persons run over by trucks would elicit a full trauma
response from the staff. Emotionally, Cindy believes the attempted suicides are the
most difficult.
the most draining patients have got to be the self inflicted gunshot 
wounds. It's really hard to spend a lot o f time working really hard 
to save someone who tried to kill himself. I mean, come on, if he 
didn't care about living, why should we spend so much time and 
effort trying to keep him alive?
Other emotionally draining situations for Cindy are the domestic abuse cases.
It gets me crazy to see women who get so busted up, lying in their
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hospital beds, when the abuser husband, or boyfriend, comes to 
visit. He's acting so lovey, dovey. hugging and kissing her. I want 
to go over to him and kick the crap out o f him. It makes me ill.
Kids getting hurt, or killed, definitively affect the staff. As Penny says, “it’s
tough to see a kid get hurt.”
Gary agrees,
emotionally, treating kids takes the most out o f you. Recently we had 
four kids really badly hurt when the pick-up they were riding in the back 
of overturned. All four kids were ejected. You feel sorry for the kids, 
and it pisses you off. What the hell were they doing in the back of 
the truck in the first place?
The two types o f  patients that Penny thinks take the most out o f her are the 
child abuse cases, which she says have been more frequently lately; and those patients 
she calls the innocents. “The innocents are those patients who didn’t deserve what 
happened to them.”
Nina elaborates on the term innocent.
It’s like the good guy - bad guy thing. If a store owner was shot 
during a robbery, for instance, he would be an innocent. If the 
robber also got shot by the police, he would be a deserved.
There is a difference in the way the staff feels when they treat different
patients. And while each nurse interviewed claimed that they “provide the same level
of medical care to each patient,” there was a distinct difference in their compassion
and emotional levels. The staff elaborates,
I know it shouldn’t matter, but it does matter how some patients 
received their injuries. You work hard treating both, but there is a 
degree o f good guy versus bad guy patient. You seem to feel worse 
when the good guy patient dies.
There is a sense o f innocent versus deserved it patient. You can’t 
help it. For the innocent victim, a guy who fell, got hit by a car, or
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was robbed, there is a little extra compassion.
You try not too. but it happens. Sometimes you think that maybe 
the patient deserved it [getting shot or stabbed]. But there are other 
times, when you get talking with them, and if they're nice, you think 
maybe they didn't deserve it. But then again, when they're here for 
the third time for another stab wound, you figure, maybe they really do 
deserve it. It becomes very easy to not have compassion.
As for the worst part of dealing with all the violence and trauma. Penny thinks
the staff is getting more and more bitter. Penny thinks many o f them really need new
jobs.
There is a tendency to immediately put people into a scumbag label. 
Sometimes the people working here now are so quick to slap that 
label on someone and call them a scumbag without really knowing 
the whole story. More times than not, they are scumbags, but 1 wish 
some people would wait a bit before deciding that. Since I’m new 
here, 1 think I see that in other people. Better than they see it in 
themselves. I hope I don’t get that way. But if  I keep working here.
I'm  afraid I might.
Cindy is capable o f recognizing herself in Penny’s observations,
1 guess I do have certain prejudices that have probably gotten worse 
over the years. When you treat the same gang member or lowlifes 
day in and day out, it sometimes reaches a point where 1 don't even 
want to go into their rooms anymore.
Wendy voices similar feelings.
Sometimes I want to throw my hands up in the air and just yell 
at some o f these kids who are doing such stupid things to them­
selves. 1 mean, come on, get with it. I’m not a  prude, and 1 wasn’t 
an angel when I was a younger. But I wasn’t ruining my life either.
Sometimes it seems that every one o f my patients is drunk or on drugs 
and 1 can't decide if 1 want to cry, or just go home.
Nina, on the other hand believes that her greatest worry associated with
dealing with so many victims of crime and violence, is something she calls a constant
awareness problem.
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it's possible that the worst thing about treating so many victims of 
crime and violence is the realization that these trauma can occur to 
anyone, at anytime. It becomes scary to think that every time you 
go to the store you could get caught in a robbery. This random 
violence can completely destroy someone’s life. The realization and 
awareness that at anytime this could be me, might be the scariest thing.
It seems to Gary that we’ve lost an entire generation o f kids to drugs and guns
and violence.
when I was a kid you could be anything you wanted: the president, an 
astronaut, anything. But now, we get these kids shot, stabbed, whatever 
and they have this blank look to them. You can see it in their eyes. They 
don’t think they’ll live long enough to grow up, let alone be anything.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
Determining the relationship between crime and violence and an organization 
as complex as UMC is far from a simple task. This chapter discusses some o f the 
pertinent findings o f  this study, as they relate to the economics, securit>' department, 
and critical care nursing staff o f the University Medical Center.
A. ECONOMICS
Economically the medical center would surely benefit i f  they were never to 
receive another gunshot or stab wound patient. Proportionally, the number of 
penetrating to blunt injury patients are within the acceptable range for trauma center 
viability. Nevertheless, UMC acquires far less economic reimbursement than it 
expends to provide trauma care. Although the trauma unit charged patients 15% more 
than the actual costs to provide their care in 1996, the hospital center received 65% 
less than it required to break even. UMC’s trauma unit is not only not making a 
profit, it is operating with increasingly large deficits. The emergency department, 
however, is economically solvent. By billing patients 190% and 205% more than the 
actual costs to provide care, the E.D. was capable o f posting small profits for the 1995 
and 1996 fiscal years. Nevertheless, their positive returns in no way compensate for 
the trauma unit’s deficits.
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This financial downside, however, may not be as detrimental as it appears. If 
the trauma center operates at a loss but the hospital center, in general, makes enough 
o f a profit to compensate for this individual departmental losses, overall financial 
viability is maintained. As trauma care losses mount, the hospital’s bottom line does 
not seem to be adversely affected. Would the hospital do better economically without 
gunshot and stab patients? O f course if  would. But do gunshot and stabbing patients 
compromise the medical center’s overall financial well being? From this analysis, the 
answer is no.
Hospital expenditures in response to internal crime, violence, and public 
safety issues are exclusively within the UMC security department’s domain. UMC 
does have a department of risk management & safety, but their responsibilities are 
predominantly matters pertaining to either staff medical malpractice, or visitor and 
employee “slips, trips and falls.”
UMC’s security expenditures have not changed dramatically in response to 
crime and violence. The return o f  the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 
detail three years ago was welcome, but came at a price. Four security positions were 
eliminated, and the cost for the Metro detail was deducted from the security 
department's budget. While this budget has increased nearly 21% since 1994, it is 
facing a 10% reduction for this upcoming fiscal year. The security department's 
primary capital expenditures have been for safety and monitoring equipment. 
Additional panic buttons, better surveillance cameras and more sophisticated 
access/entry systems have been installed or slated for installation as per security’s
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request. Security also believes that better key-pad door locks have been successful in 
reducing incidents in the critical care units.
B. SECURITY
The security department is cognizant o f the perception and realities o f high- 
risk areas within the hospital. As such, most high risk areas now have at least two 
doors, which can be locked individually or in unison. Both the emergency department 
and trauma Recess have security officers stationed outside the units 24 hours a day.
While some UMC staff have been critical o f  the security department in 
general, and o f their safety in particular, there have not been any reported incidents o f 
UMC staff members lodging official complaints with OSHA or other governmental 
agencies. It was widely reported in local newspapers that one hundred and twenty 
members o f Sunrise Hospital’s [Las Vegas] emergency department endorsed a written 
complaint to OSHA detailing their concerns about “inadequate security, security 
personnel, unlocked entrances and a lack o f panic buttons” (Huff 1997:1 B).
In a conscious attempt to ward off similar complaints, the UMC security 
department has made dedicated efforts to become more proactive in their hospital 
roles. While there have not yet been official policies issued regarding gang and other 
in-hospital violence, the security department is committed to having those prepared 
and distributed shortly. Nevertheless, unofficial official policies for known gang 
situations have been developed and instituted. When Mercy ambulance workers 
advise the hospital from the field that a gang member or potentially volatile patient 
situation is about to arrive on UMC’s doorstep, security gets activated preemptively
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and attempts to be in the E.D. o r trauma Recess prior to the patient’s arrival. It is 
believed that the presence o f  uniformed security officers will not only alleviate some 
staff concerns, but also prevent a minor situation from getting out o f  control. 
Lockdowns were being utilized prior to Parker’s promotion to chief o f security, but he 
has amended their application. Instead o f using lockdown only after a situation has 
arisen, security now occasionally institutes a lockdown preventatively. After an hour 
or so. if nothing threatening develops, the lockdown condition can be canceled. But if  
trouble had arisen, the security department would have been in a better position to 
handle it.
C. NURSING STAFF
Violence and crime are complicated, multifaceted problems, intertwined with 
a variety o f major social problems for which no easy solutions are apparent. Poverty, 
unemployment, racism, drugs and other injustices contribute in complex ways to 
violent behavior (Rosenberg, O ’Carroll & Powell 1992). One nurse astutely noted the 
blank looks on many of the young trauma victim’s faces. Prothrow-Stith ( 1993), 
points out that children chronically exposed to violence in their homes and 
communities begin to show signs o f  depression, passivity, and regression to a younger 
emotional or psychological state. Even when outward symptoms are not as obvious 
or dramatic, it is noted that these children have little energy for school work or other 
activities that would allow them to prepare for an independent future. The increasing 
violence entering the hospital setting is just one of many factors linked to the 
extraordinarily high rate o f stress and burnout for the health care provider.
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It is also commonly accepted that employees who are threatened or harmed by 
violence become less productive or simply leave for a safer workplace (Nudelman 
1995). The costs o f burnout, especially in nursing are staggering. These costs not 
only affect the institution financially, but in human terms to the patients, as well as to 
the nurses themselves (Eastburg et al. 1994). Research has shown that a staff support 
group is a critical component o f a bumout prevention program (Riordan & Saltzer 
1992). While UMC does have an employee assistance program, its purpose is 
primarily to assist staff with drinking, drug, marital, gambling or other personal 
problems - not specifically job related stress.
This stress on the UMC's critical care nurse may be one o f the reasons 
perception differences between the nursing staff and security department exist.
Nurses interviewed believe a major impact o f crime and violence is the threat to their 
personal safety by gang members and those patients under the influence o f drugs or 
alcohol. Security officer interviews and data gathered from three years o f  incident 
reports suggest that the major cost o f crime in the hospital center has more to do with 
minor property offenses and not threats or assaults against staff members. A follow- 
up study involving greater numbers o f nurses and security officers would be valuable 
to determine how these discrepancies became so ingrained behveen these hospital 
factions.
Perhaps the most notable finding o f this study, however, is the personality 
shifts and attitudinal changes that many o f the critical care nurses interviewed seemed 
to have undergone. Howard & Strauss (1975:21) commented on the variable health 
care one could receive depending upon his or her status, “the health care that we get
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
7 7
has a humanizing/dehumanizing content. Where it fails on this scale depends on the 
clarity with which our race, social class, economic status, and degree o f deviance can 
be determined.”
For the critical care nurses studied, the determining factor appears to be the 
mechanism by which the patient received his or her injuries. The innocents versus 
deserved, and the good guy versus bad guy patient, seem to be the new social class. 
Not one single nurse interviewed made a derogatory comment regarding a patient’s 
race, economic status, ethnic background, or sexual orientation. They were, however, 
extremely critical o f their patient’s drug or alcohol usage, criminal behavior, or 
membership (confirmed or suspected), in a gang. While each nurse admitted 
particular prejudices, and dissatisfaction with having to treat specific patients, none o f 
the subjects admitted to providing any less care for these patient outcasts. There were 
admissions o f  providing less compassion and less emotional involvement, but not less 
medical care. This claim o f  equal medical care may be accepted at face value or 
dismissed as an outright fabrication. A third possibility does exist. It is possible that 
these critical care nurses were unable or unwilling to recognize the subtle disparities 
in their treatment modalities. Studies o f medical personnel have shown that as the 
terminally ill patient’s health deteriorates, the length o f time their health care 
providers afford them decreases (Kastenbaum 1995; Lester 1988). It is hypothesized 
that health care provider’s decisions to spend less time with dying patients is a 
subconscious one. Perhaps an analogy can be made between nurses working with 
terminally ill patients and those nurses working in the critical care units. A more 
detailed and comprehensive examination would determine if these critical care nurses
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do indeed provide equal care for those deserved patients and for patients who were 
judged innocent by the nursing staff.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
In January o f 1989 a brutal murder occurred in New York City. Specifically. 
Kathryn Hinnant, a thirty-three year old pregnant woman, was raped, strangled and 
beaten to death in her office at work. What makes this horrific crime pertinent to this 
thesis was Ms. Hinnant’s occupation. She was a physician, a pathologist to be 
precise, and she was killed inside the Bellevue Hospital Center in Manhattan.
While vicious murders are not unheard o f in the United States, the setting for 
this heinous crime hit a particularly sensitive nerve. As Roger Rosenblatt (1989:7) 
eloquently stated, “society establishes very few places where healing and sympathy 
are the standard activities. A hospital is such a place.”
In many instances, the traditional views o f the hospital and emergency 
department as a safe haven have been turned upside down. Domestic violence 
victims may be followed into the hospital by their abusers. E.D. workers use 
pseudonyms for known gang members, in case rival gang members pursue the victim 
into the hospital. And assaults on medical staff are increasing at record paces. A 
maximum security prison should have to occasionally execute lockdowns - not a 
medical facility.
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Crime and violence seem to have the greatest impact on the UMC nursing 
staff. Every nurse interviewed admitted to being threatened by patients and visitors to 
the hospital. Many nurses have been physically accosted, luckily few staff members 
report serious injury. The health care professionals who work the critical care units at 
UMC appear to be a dedicated group o f people. They function in extremely stressful 
and tense surroundings. Every nurse interviewed expressed concern for their physical 
safety. Bumout is a frequently described emotion. Most nurses working in the 
critical care units entered the field because o f the challenge, the excitement, and the 
desire to help those most in need. And while the hours are long, and the shifts 
difficult, most expressed a willingness to try to persevere and continue in their current 
positions.
I believe an emotional and psychological toll on these emergency workers 
does occur over time. While emergency personnel try to cheat death, they know that 
inevitably death claims us all. But there is a difference. The most disturbing patients 
for these critical care nurses are the children who die. Whether from a medical 
emergency or violence, the death o f  a child seems to effect the staff on a deeper, more 
personal level, than that o f adults. For adult patients there seems to be a growing 
undercurrent o f discontent depending upon the mechanism o f injury. Formal 
treatment modalities for all patients may be the same regardless o f how they received 
their injuries. But the nurse’s compassion and emotional involvement with certain 
patients is dramatically different.
In many ways it is easier for the staff to come to grips with unintentional 
violence and illness. Heart attacks, falls and motor vehicle accidents seem to be some
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o f the inevitable circumstances surrounding day-to-day life. But the intentional 
violence that man subjects onto his fellow man seems to emotionally and 
psychologically undermine the good intentions and dedication the critical care staff 
attempts to brings forth. Almost four out o f  five serious trauma patients who arrive at 
UMC are victims o f  motor vehicle accidents or other blunt trauma. Nevertheless it is 
the shooting and stabbing victims that seem to most adversely affect the staff. When 
the nursing staff is less affected by the death o f a patient because they view him, or 
her, as a patient deserved o f whatever demise befell him, serious misgivings must be 
maintained. Is this what we expect from the persons most in a position to render care 
and compassion? When society is capable o f  destroying one o f the basic tenets o f 
nursing, we must take a  serious look at ourselves.
The greatest hidden cost o f crime and violence on the University Medical 
Center of Southern Nevada may not a tangible, concrete figure or factor. A draining 
o f  the human spirit is occurring. Through sheer volume and intensity, crime and 
violence has dented the emotional armor o f UMC’s critical care nurses. This 
weakened resolve may be an early warning sign for health care professionals. We 
cannot continue to subject our caregivers to these stresses and strains with impunity.
For one day, we all may be lying in our hospital beds wondering i f  the nurses 
are ever coming back.
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW GUIDE
1) Personal Safety:
Have you ever been threatened by a patient?
Have you ever been threatened by a visitor to the hospital?
Have you ever needed assistance because your safety was being threatened? 
When you needed help, who provided it? (security, coworkers, police, etc.) 
Have you ever been assaulted on the job?
Were you injured?
Have you encountered patients who were carrying weapons?
Have you encountered visitors to the hospital who were carrying weapons?
2) Security:
What ways are there to request help when you’re working?
When you first started at UMC did you feel that security was adequate?
Do you still feel that security is adequate?
Do you feel safe when you’re at work? (why or why not)
Do you feel that the hospital is concerned with your personal safety?
When training, inser\dce, or instruction did UMC give you to ensure your 
personal safety?
Are there policies on workplace violence, assaults o r dangerous situations?
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Are there security checkpoints or metal detectors at UMC?
3) Gangs:
Have you ever had to treat gang members?
Were you more scared than when treating other patients?
Did any members o f the gang come to visit the patient?
Were there problems?
Does the hospital have any set policies or protocols for dealing with gang 
members?
Does security get more involved when gang members are in the hospital?
Does the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) get more 
involved when gang members are in the hospital?
There have been some highly publicized incidents of gang members following 
victims to the hospital to “finish off the job”. Has anything like that happened 
at UMC?
Does that possibility scare you?
4) .Attitudes:
Is there a difference in the way you feel when you treat a victim of violence 
(e.g. shooting victim vs. motor vehicle accident)?
Does it matter how your patient received his/her injuries?
Does it take “more out o f you” emotionally to treat certain types o f patients?
Do you think your job is more PHYSICALLY, EMOTIONALLY or 
PSYCHOLOGICALLY demanding?
Which type of patient is the hardest to treat?
How long do you plan to continue working at UMC?
What do you think are some o f the hidden costs o f crime and violence on 
UMC?
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